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  Although Plato’s views on Friendship, or philia, are almost always found 
embedded in discussions of erotic love, I argue that these views nevertheless constitute a 
clear and compelling picture of the nature and value of the best kinds of friendship.  
Moreover, I suggest that these views on friendship present us with a surprising insight 
into Plato’s overall conception of the practice of philosophy, as a personal process of 
striving for knowledge at the center of the best human life.  To tease out these views on 
philia, I begin with a close reading of Plato’s Phaedrus.  As many have noted, this 
dialogue appears at first to be strangely disunified: its first half is concerned primarily 
with giving an account of erotic love, while its second half is devoted to a discussion of 
the nature and value of rhetoric.  I begin by examining the theory of erotic love presented 
by Socrates in the ‘palinode’ at the center of the Phaedrus, and arguing that we can begin 
to see a theory of philia emerging from this account.  I then argue that a central element 
of this theory of philia, as presented in the palinode to love, provides us with a link to the 
later discussion of rhetoric, and a unifying theme for the Phaedrus as a whole: the 
knowledge of souls.  With this unifying theme in hand, I return to the account of philia, 
and eros, in the first half of the Phaedrus and, in light of this topic, draw further 
conclusions about Plato’s views of the importance of philia, and eros, to philosophy.
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Introduction: The Philosophy of Friendship in Plato
Discussions of the philosophy of friendship almost always begin with Aristotle.  
Whether they intend to agree with him or not, most philosophers writing on friendship 
feel the need to take Aristotle’s theory into account, as the first fully articulated theory of 
friendship in the western tradition, and to orient their own positions relative to his.  Very 
few philosophers of friendship, however, feel obliged to address Plato’s views.  Those 
who do seem quite comfortable dismissing his theory of friendship as a half-formed 
subsidiary to his theory of erotic love, articulated poorly and with little commitment in 
the aporetic Lysis, and largely irrelevant to his vision of philosophy and of the good life 
on the whole.1  I would like to argue that this perception of Plato is wrong.  While Plato’s 
views on friendship, or philia, are almost invariably found embedded in discussions of 
erotic love, I would nevertheless like to argue that these views constitute a clear and 
compelling picture of the value of friendship, of the best sort, in both our ordinary and 
philosophical lives.  Moreover, I would like to suggest that these views of friendship 
present us with a somewhat surprising insight into Plato’s overall conception of the 
practice of philosophy, as a personal process of striving for knowledge at the center of the 
best human life. 
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1 See, e.g. Julia Annas. “Plato and Aristotle on Friendship and Altruism.” Mind, New Series, 86. 344 (Oct. 
1977): 532-554.  Hereafter, ‘Annas.’  
 Annas does argue, however, and many seem to accept, that the aporetic ‘problems’ posed by Plato 
in the Lysis provide an important context for Aristotle’s later account; See e.g. Jennifer Whiting. “The 
Nicomachean Account of Philia.” The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Ed. Richard 
Kraut. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.) 276-304.  Hereafter, ‘Whiting.’
 In trying to tease out these views on philia, I would like to begin with a close 
reading of Plato’s Phaedrus.  As many have noted, this dialogue appears at first glance to 
be strangely disunified: its first half is concerned primarily with giving an account of 
erotic love, while its second half is devoted almost entirely to a discussion of the nature 
and value of rhetoric.  I would like to begin by examining the theory of erotic love 
presented by Socrates in the ‘palinode’ at the center of the Phaedrus, and arguing that we 
can begin to see a theory of philia emerging from this account.  I would then like to argue 
that a central element of this theory of philia, as presented in the palinode to love, 
provides us with a link to the later discussion of rhetoric, and a unifying theme for the 
Phaedrus as a whole, namely, the knowledge of souls.  With this unifying theme in hand, 
we can then turn back to the account of philia and eros in the first half of the Phaedrus 
and, in light of this topic, draw further conclusions about Plato’s views of the importance 
of philia, and eros, to philosophy.
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I. Love and the Nature of the Soul
 Socrates’ palinode to love in the Phaedrus begins rather strangely with a defense 
of madness.  Eros has been accused, in the preceding speeches criticizing love, of being a 
kind of madness, a madness which makes its victims lose their self-control and grip on 
reason, forgetting their own best interests and behaving erratically, even violently, 
towards both their beloved and others.  Rather than rejecting this criticism outright, 
Socrates concedes that love is a kind of madness, but maintains that the important 
question is not this, but rather what kind of madness it is.  While some kinds of madness 
are admittedly harmful, he argues, others can be extremely beneficial, and even “god-
sent.”2  Such beneficial kinds of madness, like prophetic trances and poetic inspiration, 
enable those whom they have “driven out of their minds”3 to achieve things far beyond 
what they are capable of when sane or “in control of themselves.”4  That love is a kind of 
madness, then, will stand as a meaningful criticism only if it isn’t a madness of such a 
beneficial kind.  Socrates thus proposes to argue that love is a beneficial madness of just 
this sort.  Love, he maintains, though it is a kind of madness, is a ‘divine’ kind of 
madness “sent by the gods as a benefit to a lover and his boy,”5 and to all of us “to ensure 
our greatest good fortune.”6 
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2 Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John M. 
Cooper.(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997) 245b2.  Hereafter ‘Phaedrus.’
3 Phaedrus 245a7.
4 Phaedrus 244b4.
5 Phaedrus 245b7.
6 Phaedrus 245b8-c1.
 Already here, then, we are beginning to see what looks like a departure from the 
most familiar reading of the ‘ascent of love’ as outlined by Diotima in Plato’s 
Symposium.  To defend love we must not only show that it is of great benefit to the lover, 
but, apparently, that it is of equally great benefit to the beloved.  Diotima’s account in the 
Symposium provides us with only the faintest of hints of how such a defense might be 
accomplished.  In the palinode, however, to give such a defense is Socrates’ stated aim.  
And the picture of eros which he paints for us here begins not with a depiction of what 
the lover hopes to gain from his relationship with the beloved, as Diotima’s account 
arguably does,7 but with an abstract account of the nature of the human soul.  Having 
outlined several ways in which a madness can be “god-sent”8 and beneficial, and declared 
his intention to defend love in this way, Socrates turns abruptly to a theory of the nature 
of the soul.  If we are to defend love as a kind of divine and beneficial madness, he 
maintains, “we must first understand the truth about the nature of the soul, divine or 
human.... Here begins the proof.”9  But why should an account of the nature of the soul 
play such a central role in our our defense of love?  It seems that a significant part of 
Socrates’ answer will ultimately be that such an understanding of the nature of our souls 
is among the greatest benefits which love has to offer us, both in the role of lover and in 
the role of beloved.  The benefits love offers to each party to an erotic relationship, then, 
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7 Plato. Symposium. Trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John M. 
Cooper.  (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997) 206a-b.  Hereafter ‘Symposium.’
8 Phaedrus 245b2.
9 Phaedrus 245c1-2.
are not differentiated in the way one might expect in traditional Greek homosexual 
practice, with the lover receiving certain benefits in exchange for very different benefits 
he offers the beloved.  Rather, the beloved and the lover both benefit from the 
relationship in what is essentially the same way, although the historical development of 
the relationship is somewhat different for the beloved than the lover.  Nevertheless, if the 
benefit to be expected by the beloved is the same as that accruing to the lover, then the 
claim that such a relationship provides the greatest benefit to both parties becomes much 
more straightforward to defend. 
 But to say all of this gets ahead of our argument.  To establish these points, we 
need first to examine the account Socrates offers of the nature of the soul.  The soul, first 
of all, is immortal.10  As such, it pre-exists our birth into this world, in an un-embodied 
form.  To accurately describe the nature of this un-embodied soul, however, would be 
nearly impossible, “a task for a god in every way,”11 and so, Socrates suggests, we should 
attempt instead only to “say what it is like,”12 and illuminate its nature by analogy, since 
to do this “is humanly possible, and takes less time.”13  The account that he offers us, 
then, is an elaborate analogical myth, depicting the nature not only of the human soul, but 
of “all soul,”14 godly, human, and otherwise.  Every soul, he argues, is like a chariot-
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10 Phaedrus 245c3.
11 Phaedrus 246a3-4.
12 Phaedrus 246a4.
13 Phaedrus 246a2-4.
14 Phaedrus 246b2.
team, composed of a charioteer and two horses, which are naturally and inseparably 
bound together into a single being, and held aloft in heaven by wings which spring from 
“every part” of it.15   The souls of the gods and of all other beings share this basic 
structure, and the central difference between the souls of the gods and those of other 
beings is in the natural character of the horses which the charioteer drives.  In the souls of 
the gods both horses are naturally good and well-behaved, obedient to their charioteer 
and well-matched to one another.  In the souls of other beings, however, only one of the 
horses is like those of the gods, while the other is naturally ill-tempered and unruly, prone 
to disobey the charioteer and undermine the efforts of its teammate.  It follows that while 
the souls of the gods move themselves through heaven with a natural ease and precision, 
“chariot-driving in our case is inevitably a painful and difficult business,”16 even in this 
un-embodied form.  Our un-embodied souls are nevertheless able to travel with the gods 
through the universe in an orderly procession, helping them to oversee the workings of 
the inanimate world.17  As each god has his own place in this heavenly procession, so 
does each soul, following in the ranks arrayed under the command of one of the gods as 
he tends to those parts of the universe which are his special concern.  These un-embodied 
souls, both gods and otherwise, take their nourishment from the contemplation of what 
lies beyond the heavens which they oversee: the eternal and unchanging reality of “being 
 
6
15 Phaedrus 246a5-6 & 251b7-8.
16 Phaedrus 246b4-5.
17 Phaedrus 246b7-c1 & 246e5-247a1.
that really is what it is, the subject of all true knowledge.”18  Their sustenance, then, is the 
knowledge they gain from this vision of true reality, which can only be taken in by 
“intelligence, the soul’s steersman,”19 that is, by the chariot driver.  The divine procession 
of souls travels regularly up to the edge of the heavens to engage in this “banquet”20 of 
knowledge, and “when the soul has seen all the things that are as they are and feasted on 
them, it sinks back inside heaven and goes home.”21
 However, this journey to the edge of heaven to feast on knowledge is a very 
different undertaking for the gods than for the souls of other sorts of beings, who are 
hindered in all of their motions by the unruliness of their bad horse.  The way up to the 
edge of heaven is a steep and difficult incline, and while the gods navigate this challenge 
easily, with their skillful charioteers and disciplined horses, the rest of the souls struggle 
badly to reach the top and be able to see the real beings.  The most successful souls, who 
have managed to make themselves most like the gods, are able to follow them close to 
the rim of heaven, and peer over the edge to see all of the real things beyond.  In doing 
this, however, they are constantly distracted by the effort required to keep their horses 
under control, and so the view that they have is less perfect than that achieved by the 
gods.  Other souls rise up and sink down erratically as their horses pull in different 
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18 Phaedrus 247c7-d1.
19 Phaedrus 247d1.
20 Phaedrus 247b1.
21 Phaedrus 247e2-2-4.
directions, affording brief views of only some of the real things passing by.22  Still others 
are unable to reach the edge at all, struggling violently with themselves and others in a 
chaotic scramble to climb higher, but ultimately having to return to heaven unnourished 
by reality, and sustained only by “their own opinions.”23  Since the wings of the soul are 
nourished by the “plain where truth stands,”24 those who fail to reach the top fail to 
nourish their wings, and “many souls are crippled by the incompetence of the drivers, and 
many wings break much of their plumage”25 in the unsuccessful struggle to climb up.  In 
this weakened state, the souls which return to heaven without having fed on reality are 
left vulnerable, and if any one of them “by some accident takes on a burden of 
forgetfulness and wrongdoing, then it is weighed down, sheds its wings, and falls to 
earth.”26  Each soul in its first life is born into the body of a human being, with the souls 
who have seen more of reality born into those with better natural dispositions, while 
those who have seen less are born into those with less desirable natural characters.  A soul 
who has seen the most will be born into someone disposed to become “a lover of wisdom 
or of beauty, or who will be cultivated in the arts and prone to erotic love,”27 while a soul 
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22 The real things do not themselves move, rather, the rim of heaven spins, carrying the gods and successful 
souls past each of the real things successively (see Phaedrus 247c1-e4).
23 Phaedrus 248b5.
24 Phaedrus 248b6.
25 Phaedrus 248b2-3.
26 Phaedrus 248c7-d1.
27 Phaedrus 248d3-4.
who has seen the least will be born into someone with the disposition of a tyrant.28  But 
all such human souls will at some point have seen something of the truth outside heaven, 
“since a human being must understand speech in terms of general forms, proceeding to 
bring many perceptions together into a reasoned unity,”29 and we gain this ability only 
through “the recollection of the things our soul saw when it was traveling with god.”30
 All of our souls, then, have a natural desire to return to their original place in 
heaven, traveling with the gods.  But to do so is extremely difficult.  At the end of its 
mortal life, each soul is judged for its behavior while embodied, and receives rewards or 
punishments in the afterlife accordingly.  But it is not able to return to its place with the 
gods in this afterlife, until it has regrown its wings.  And to do this ordinarily takes a very 
long time, at least ten lifetimes, or ten-thousand years.  After a thousand years in the 
afterlife, each soul chooses another life to be born into on earth, and here each has a 
chance to change who it will be.  The souls which had originally been born into one type 
of human being may choose to be born into a better or worse type, or even to be born into 
a non-human animal, if they prefer that sort of life to a human one.  With each passing 
lifetime, then, each soul has a chance to better or worsen its condition, both in terms of 
the quality of the character with which it is born, and the choices it goes on to make 
during its lifetime.
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28 Phaedrus 248e5.
29 Phaedrus 249b6-c2.
30 Phaedrus 249c3.
 And one of the most crucial of these choices, Plato argues, is the way in which we 
choose to respond to love, that is, to eros.  Eros, he explains is that “kind of madness... 
which someone shows when he sees the beauty we have down here and is reminded of 
true beauty...”31
 ...then he takes wing and flutters in his eagerness to rise up, but is unable to do so, and he gazes 
 aloft, like a bird, paying no attention to what is down below – and that is what brings on him the 
 charge that he has gone mad.  This is the best and noblest of all the forms that possession by god 
 can take for anyone who has it or is connected to it, and when someone who loves beautiful boys 
 is touched by this madness he is called a lover.32
Notice, then, that this description of eros does not seem to be restricted to those ‘who 
love beautiful boys,’ rather, the love of beautiful boys is plausibly interpreted as only one 
kind of such eros, that is, the kind with which we are most concerned here.  This 
description of eros, then, seems entirely compatible with the many instances in which 
Plato speaks of eros as directed not only at persons, but at wisdom, the Forms, 
philosophy, and many other things.33  However, the focus in the palinode is not on eros in 
this general sense, but rather that specific sort of eros which is directed toward persons.  
Furthermore, beauty itself is not the object of this kind of eros, but rather the spark, so to 
speak, which touches it off.  
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31 Phaedrus 249d4-5.
32 Phaedrus 249d5-e4.
33 See, e.g., Plato. Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C Reeve. Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John M. 
Cooper. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997) VI.490a7-b9, VI.499b4-c2, & VI.501d1.  Hereafter ‘Republic’;  
Plato. Gorgias. Trans. Donald J. Zeyl. Plato: Complete Works. Ed. John M. Cooper. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1997) 481d2-6;  Symposium 210d1-211d1.
II. The Lover Falls in Love
 The process of falling in love, Plato argues, begins with the violent awe inspired 
in us by an encounter with physical beauty, but this is only the beginning of such eros, 
and a love which never moved beyond this stage would be a relatively shallow and 
unfruitful one.  The objects which all human souls most naturally admire, he argues, are 
those perfectly real beings which all of us encountered at some time before our births.  
We must all remember these perfect beings to some extent or another, insofar as we are 
capable of understanding language.34  Our recollection of these beings, however, is 
obscure and imperfect, and many of us have no conscious awareness of this recollection 
at all.  Some of us, moreover, are less able to recollect these perfect beings than others, 
depending upon the experiences which our souls have had in the time before our births 
and since.  Those who have seen more of reality, and who have done more to preserve 
their memories of what they did see, are better able to recall the nature of these perfect 
beings, recollecting them with both greater ease and greater clarity.35  Some people, then, 
are easily reminded of these perfect beings by an encounter with “their images down 
here,”36 while others are extremely difficult to move towards such a recollection.  Beauty, 
however, enjoys a special status as a potential object of such recollection.  The 
“likenesses”37 which we encounter here on earth of the majority of perfect beings, such as 
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34 See above p. 9.
35 Phaedrus 249e4-250a6.
36 Phaedrus 250b2-3.
37 Phaedrus 250b5.
wisdom38 or justice, are not directly observable through our physical senses, but must to 
some extent be inferred from that which we immediately perceive.39  The ‘likenesses’ of 
beauty, on the other hand, can be directly perceived through our senses, and, moreover, 
through “the clearest of our senses,”40 our sight.  Unlike those things which might remind 
us of the other perfect beings, then, which require some careful attention and work to 
make out, a perception of beauty in the things ‘down here’ can come upon us 
unexpectedly, when we have not at all set out to look for it.  
 When some among the human souls ‘down here,’ then, in the course of their 
embodied human lives, are suddenly confronted with beauty in this way, taken off guard 
by an encounter with something which more closely resembles its perfect counterpart 
than any other thing which they are able to directly perceive, they are “startled,”41 and 
“beside themselves, and their experience is beyond their comprehension because they 
cannot fully grasp what they are seeing.”42  Then, as they attempt to make sense of what 
they are feeling, the course of the eros this encounter has sparked in them may turn 
several different ways, depending upon how they come to understand and respond to it.  
Someone who has forgotten much of the real things he saw, or who has obscured his 
memories of them even further through a life of vice, “is not to be moved abruptly from 
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38 Phaedrus 250d3-7.
39 Phaedrus 250b2-5.
40 Phaedrus 250d3.
41 Phaedrus 250a7.
42 Phaedrus 250a8-b1.
here to a vision of Beauty itself when he sees what we call beauty here,”43 and so he is 
likely to interpret this powerful experience only as a physical lust or desire.  Such a 
person consequently “surrenders to pleasure and sets out in the manner of a four-footed 
beast,”44 pursuing sex without further reflection upon what has happened to him.  
Someone who is closer to his memories of true beauty, on the other hand, is struck by a 
mysterious “reverence”45 for the possessor of this earthly beauty, as the experience 
reminds him of the things that he “felt at an earlier time,”46 in the presence of Beauty 
itself.  In the presence of this earthly reflection of beauty, the long-dormant roots of the 
wings of his soul begin to be nurtured again, as they were by the vision of true beauty in 
heaven, and “the soul seethes and throbs in this condition.... like a child whose teeth are 
just starting to grow in,”47 as it begins to regain its wings.  The only relief for this pain is 
to stay in the presence of the earthly beauty which began the process, and which 
nourishes the newly sprouting wings of the soul and eases the discomfort of their growth, 
replacing the maddening frustration of their struggle to grow with pleasure and joy at the 
soul’s revitalization.  And so this second sort of lover is desperate to remain near the 
object of his eros, but is still unsure of what it is that moves him to this desperation, and 
“this is the experience we humans call love.”48
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43 Phaedrus 250e3.
44 Phaedrus 250e5-6.
45 Phaedrus 251a5.
46 Phaedrus 251a4.
47 Phaedrus 251b9-10.
48 Phaedrus 252b3.
 But an eros which stopped here would still be one which brought little benefit, to 
either the lover or beloved.  Though this unreflective experience of beauty is enough to 
begin the re-growth of the soul’s wings, if the progress of the lover’s eros went no further 
than this, then his soul would remain in this desperate and frustrated state, confused as to 
how its sudden need could be satisfied.  As such a lover’s eros draws him closer to the 
possessor of this beauty, however, while the soul’s bad horse advocates that he interpret 
his need only as a desire for sex, he is “struck by the boy’s face, as if by a bolt of 
lightning,”49 and “when the charioteer sees that face, his memory is carried back to the 
real nature of Beauty, and he sees it again where it stands on the sacred pedestal next to 
Self-control.”50  Awe-struck by this recollection of the perfect beings, the soul pulls up 
short in its pursuit of the beloved, restraining its bad horse in the realization that physical 
gratification is not the only thing it really wants.  The lover now understands, instead, that 
his desire to be close to his beloved is caused by the way his beloved reminds him of the 
perfect beings he saw in heaven, and the way that his beloved’s presence makes him feel 
again the way that he once felt in the presence of those perfect beings, when he was still 
“pure”51 and “free of all troubles...and...gazed in rapture at sacred revealed objects that 
were perfect, and simple, and unshakable and blissful.”52  Understanding his eros in this 
context, as a need which draws him closer to the ‘sacred’ world and self which he has 
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49 Phaedrus 254b5.
50 Phaedrus 254b5-8.
51 Phaedrus 250c5.
52 Phaedrus 250c2-4.
lost, he is able to resist the pull of the bad horse to convert this desire into a simple 
physical lust, and to bring the bad horse gradually under control, fighting against its 
influence and teaching it the discipline to follow the commands of the charioteer.  
Eventually, when the bad horse in the soul “stops being so insolent”53 in the face of the 
lover’s resistance to its impulses, and “is humble enough to follow the charioteer’s 
warnings,”54 the lover is able to guide his soul’s response to eros in the way that he now 
understands to be most appropriate to the cause of these powerful feelings in himself, and 
“now at last the lover’s soul follows its boy in reverence and awe,”55 without 
discomforted confusion, or dissension from the bad horse in the soul.
 At this point, then, one might still plausibly interpret the object of this eros not as 
the beloved himself, but the beauty and perfection which the lover is reminded of by him.  
This changes, however, as the violent attraction which the lover has felt towards the 
beloved evolves from a unidirectional desire into a continuing relationship between the 
lover and beloved.  Though the initial stage of eros which we have been describing might, 
one imagines, strike a lover in the presence of any physically beautiful person, physical 
beauty alone will not be enough to sustain his desire to be near his beloved over time, 
once he has achieved this insight into what has caused his response to that beauty.  
Though one might experience an intense desire of this sort for anyone beautiful, one does 
not necessarily come to love, in any more robust and lasting sense, any or every such 
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53 Phaedrus 254e7.
54 Phaedrus 254e9-10.
55 Phaedrus 254e9-10.
person, and something beyond physical beauty alone must explain why this is.  And this 
is because, Plato argues, “everyone chooses his love after his own fashion from among 
those who are beautiful,”56 and this choice is not made on the basis of the beloved’s 
physical beauty, but on that of his character.  
 Although we have been focusing so far primarily upon the differences in character 
which result from the different experiences which each soul has had, and the different 
choices it has made, both before and after its birth, we should remember that Plato’s 
analogical myth picks out two distinct ways in which human souls might be differentiated 
into broad character types, and these two divisions run largely orthogonal to one another.  
One such division is in terms of the soul’s success in achieving a vision of the real beings 
outside of heaven, and in preserving its memories of what it has seen once it has been 
born into a life on earth.  Where a given soul falls within this division may, Plato argues 
explicitly, change over time, as each soul chooses how to live its life, and what sort of life 
to be reborn to, gradually eroding or shoring up the memories it has of the truth.  The 
other division, however, has to do with an aspect of each soul which does not change 
after its birth into life here on earth: the particular god which that soul had attended in its 
travels through heaven before it was born.  Recall that those souls who were most 
successful in achieving a vision of the real beings outside heaven were those who were 
able to make themselves most like the gods, emulating most perfectly the god whom they  
followed.  A soul who will be born into the world with the best sort of character, then, 
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56 Phaedrus 252d5-e1.
that of ‘a lover of wisdom or of beauty’ or of an individual ‘cultivated in the arts’ or 
‘prone to erotic love,’ will be “one that follows a god most closely, making itself most 
like that god”57 during the time before its birth.  But which god such a soul emulates in 
order to make itself most perfect will depend upon which god it follows in the heavenly 
procession.  The path to its greatest perfection, then, may vary from soul to soul, 
depending upon which god each soul naturally follows, insofar as the division according 
to quality of character is made within the set of souls attendant upon each god, according 
to their success in emulating that god, rather than according to which god each soul 
attends.  And this second sort of division among souls, Plato argues, will persist into our 
lives here on earth, at least insofar as our own forgetfulness and misguided choices fail to 
obscure it, so that “everyone spends his life honoring the god in whose chorus he danced, 
and emulates that god in every way he can, so long as he remains undefiled.”58
 When a lover turns from the immediate disorientation of an encounter with 
physical beauty, Plato argues, to the process of pursuing a lasting love with one among 
those who possess such beauty, it is this second aspect of character which he turns his 
attention to in those around him.  He searches, specifically, for a beloved whose character 
is like his own in terms of the god he once followed, that is, whose basic and unchanging 
character type is like his own, aside from its achievements in recalling the truth.  He 
seeks out for his beloved, then, not the most accomplished soul, but a soul which displays 
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the potential to develop itself in the way that he personally most admires, and to achieve 
that particular sort of greatest perfection after which he strives for himself.  A ‘Zeus type’ 
soul, for example, as it strives to make itself more like Zeus, will also “choose someone 
to love who is a Zeus himself in the nobility of his soul,”59 someone who “has a talent for 
philosophy and the guidance of others,”60 and likewise for the souls who followed any of 
the other gods: “they take their god’s path and seek for their own a boy whose nature is 
like the god’s.”61  This nature, however, need only be a ‘talent’ or a disposition in the 
beloved, not yet a fully realized ability or virtue.  The lover searches for a beloved who 
has the capacity to become the sort of man whom he himself most hopes to be, whether 
either of them have achieved much with respect to this goal yet or not.  And since it is the 
natural hope of each soul to emulate its own god as perfectly as possible, and a beloved 
with such a disposition will himself be a soul who followed the same god as the lover, the 
lover is seeking out not only a beloved who shares a similar disposition to his own, but a 
beloved who shares the same aspirations, whether the beloved is yet aware of these 
aspirations in himself or not.
 And once he has found such a beloved, the lover’s driving aim is “to help him 
take on as much of their own god’s qualities as possible,”62 at least “so far as a human 
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being can share a god’s life.”63  And so, “once they have found him and are in love with 
him they do everything to develop that talent”64 which first drew them to him in their 
search for a beloved.  In order to do this, however, to help the beloved progress towards 
the realization of his potential to emulate their shared god, the lover himself must develop  
a better understanding of that god’s true nature, and of his own, and his beloved’s, natures 
and standings with respect to that god.  He cannot effectively assist his beloved in 
achieving their shared goal, that is, without a working knowledge of what that goal is, 
and of how human beings like themselves might go about achieving it.  And so, “if any 
lovers have not yet embarked on this practice,” presumably, of deliberately seeking to 
emulate their god, “then they start to learn, using any source they can and also making 
progress on their own.”65  And the lover’s ability to do this, to seek out a greater 
understanding of his god and himself with respect to that god, has been greatly 
augmented by his experience of love.  Such lovers “are well equipped to track down their 
god’s true nature with their own resources because of their driving need to gaze at the 
god, and as they are in touch with the god by memory they are inspired by him and adopt 
his customs and practices.... For all of this they know they have the boy to thank, and so 
they love him all the more.”66
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III. How Love Transforms the Lover
 What, then, should we take to have happened to the lover in the course of this 
process of falling in love, as Plato has described it to us here?  And how is it that the eros 
which he feels for his beloved has put him in a position to more effectively pursue his 
individual project of living a life as much as possible like that of his god, of reshaping his 
own soul in the image of the god whom he follows?  The changes which Plato describes 
as taking place in the lover under the influence of love look at least partially 
epistemological, and partially motivational.  Before this experience, it seems, the lover 
may well be entirely unaware of his recollections of the perfect beings and the 
experiences of his soul before his birth.  The sudden confrontation with physical beauty, 
however, breaks his complacency in accepting the world around him as the one which is 
most certainly real, and about which he can most reliably know.  In the course of his 
ordinary life, he has found himself confronted with a reaction in his soul which his 
knowledge of the everyday world cannot adequately explain.  He is ultimately forced, 
then, if he has the self-awareness and perspective to recognize this reaction as something 
more than what can be accounted for completely by his animal needs, to look for an 
explanation of this power which beauty has over him in something beyond his 
experiences thus far in this world.  He is forced to turn to a recollection of the true nature 
of Beauty in order to understand the disproportionate effect which the beauty in this 
world has had on him, if he is to escape the tortured confusion into which this experience 
has thrown his soul.  And once he has been forced to confront his recollection of one of 
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the perfect beings, he is no longer able to ignore such recollection, or to take it for 
granted, as he once did.  When his mind is cast back, almost involuntarily, to his vision of 
true Beauty by the shock of proximity to the beauty which he has encountered here, he is 
also put in mind of the context in which he experienced this Beauty, of the other perfect 
beings which stood alongside it outside of heaven,67 and of the state of his own soul as it 
was when he first experienced this vision.  He experiences this vision of Beauty, and the 
intimation, at least, of some of its context, as something like a revelation, from which he 
cannot simply turn back to his previous way of life.   
 Having experienced this revelation of Beauty, however, what is it that moves the 
lover from his fascination with the physical beauty of the body which has caused this 
reaction, to the search for a beloved with a certain type of soul?  Plato does not address 
this transition explicitly here in the Phaedrus, but we may imagine, from what he has said 
elsewhere, how this transformation in the focus of the lover’s eros, from the physical to 
the spiritual or psychological, is meant to take place.  True Beauty, Plato has argued 
elsewhere, is not best approximated in this world by the physical.  Physical beauty is the 
most efficacious trigger for our recollection of true Beauty, because it is that aspect of 
beauty which is most easily accessible to us in this world, as something which can be 
directly perceived through the senses, without the assistance of a previously well-
developed understanding of what beauty is.  But once the lover has experienced his 
revelatory recollection of the true nature of beauty, he will realize that Beauty is 
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approximated far more closely by “a soul that is beautiful and noble and well formed”68 
than it can be by anything physical, and that “the beauty of people’s souls is more 
valuable than the beauty of their bodies.”69  Once he has realized this, the physical beauty 
of a human body will no longer be enough to satisfy his newfound need to be near that 
which is beautiful.  He will be driven to seek out a kind of beauty which more closely 
approximates the true nature of beauty which he has come to understand, and this will 
require him to find a beloved who is beautiful in soul as well as body.
 Why, then, does the lover not simply seek out the most actually beautiful soul 
which he can find to pursue as his beloved, rather than searching for a beloved who 
displays a certain sort of personality type or potential?  It seems that this must have to do 
with some aspect of his experience outside of the insight which he has achieved into the 
nature of beauty specifically.  Otherwise, his eros would carry him almost invariably 
towards the most already perfect soul he could find.  And the most obviously relevant 
aspect of his experience of the recollection of Beauty, in this connection, is the state in 
which he now recalls his soul to have been at the time when he first encountered this 
perfect being, providing him with a newfound insight into the nature of his own soul.  
The project towards which his revelation of Beauty directs him, then, is at least in part 
one of self-exploration and development.  This vivid recollection of a perfect being 
beyond the physical world of his everyday experience has opened his eyes not only to the 
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paucity of the ‘reality’ which he currently inhabits, but also to the fact that he himself, in 
his most pure form, is a denizen not of this physical world, but of the world of soul which 
he inhabited when he first encountered this perfect being.  He has not only turned away 
from the physical and towards the psychological or spiritual in terms of his understanding 
of beauty, then, but also in his overall focus and prioritization, in his understanding of 
what is most important to and for himself.  He now sees that his true self, that self with 
which he should be most concerned, is his soul, and that the experience and interests of 
this soul extend far beyond the concerns of his current embodied self.  This new 
understanding must come with a corresponding shift in perspective as to what is most 
important to his own interests and satisfaction.  And surely some part of the newfound 
strength which he gains to combat the ‘bad horse’ in his soul is the realization, through 
this revelation, however partial, of his own true nature, that a gratification of those sorts 
of desires will never be enough to bring his soul real satisfaction.  What he most desires, 
he now realizes, is not to obtain or possess any given thing, but rather himself to be in a 
certain state, or become a certain sort of being.  And he now perceives the particular type 
of eros which he is experiencing in the context of this new understanding of himself and 
his desires more generally.
 But the sort of being which he now realizes that he most desires to be is not, 
importantly, one of the perfectly real beings themselves.  The perfectly real beings, like 
Beauty itself, are described in Plato’s analogical myth as perfectly static and unchanging, 
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unmoving and unmoved, outside of the heavens which exhaust the dynamic world.70  The 
soul, on the other hand, both human and divine, is defined by its motion and change, and 
by a complete inability ever to be static or unchanging.  Every soul is in essence a “self-
mover,”71 and “what moves itself... never desists from motion, since it does not leave off 
being itself.”72  There is a certain sense, then, in which a soul cannot, in principle, be 
perfect, at least not in the complete sense in which the perfectly real beings are.  
However, Plato explicitly describes the souls of the gods, and the others among the souls 
in heaven who are most successful in becoming like the gods, as perfect.  At the time 
when our un-embodied souls attended the divine banquet of knowledge, he argues, “we 
who celebrated it were wholly perfect, and free of all the troubles that awaited us in time 
to come.”73  Presumably, then, these souls are perfect in some sense other than that in 
which the perfectly real beings are.  Moreover, there seems to be a sense in which even 
an embodied human being may be ‘perfect,’ since “A man who uses reminders of these 
things [presumably, the perfectly real beings, and possibly his other experiences in 
heaven as well] correctly is always at the highest, most perfect level of initiation, and he 
is the only one who is as perfect as perfect can be.”74  The kind of ‘perfection’ being 
hinted at here, then, seems not to be the complete perfection which one finds in the 
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perfectly real beings, but rather, the kind of ‘perfection’ which we can attribute to a thing 
which has become as perfect as a thing of that sort could possibly be.  Even the gods, it 
seems, are not really ‘wholly’ perfect, nor are they themselves the most wholly divine 
beings, but acquire both their perfection and their divinity, to some extent, derivatively, 
from their proximity to the perfectly real beings.  It is only these perfectly real beings 
outside of heaven which are fully perfect, and which make up the “realities by being 
close to which the gods are divine.”75  The gods themselves then, are not completely 
perfect beings, but rather, the most perfect possible souls.  And so when we, as souls, 
aspire to be perfect, what we must aspire to be is like them.  
 When the lover experiences his revelatory recollection of Beauty, then, it seems 
that he becomes aware, to whatever extent, of at least three things: first, the existence 
and, to some extent, the nature of the perfectly real beings; second, the existence and, to 
some extent, the nature of the gods, and in particular of his own god; and third, the 
existence and, to some extent, the nature of his own immaterial soul.  He consequently 
comes to realize, however clearly or confusedly, several different things about the nature 
of his own aspirations.  He realizes, first, that he desires desperately to be in the presence 
of the perfectly real beings again, and, moreover, that this is something which can only be 
accomplished in the very long term, and not in his embodied life on earth.  Second, he 
realizes that he himself was once a much more perfect and contented being than he is 
now, and that he desires to be this sort of being again, to become again his more perfect, 
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and most perfect, self.  He further realizes, it seems, that this most perfect self which he 
once was possessed a certain sort of perfection, and that it achieved this particular sort of 
perfection by emulating the most perfect example of perfection of that kind, in the person 
of a particular god.  Third, he realizes that he desires desperately to be in the presence of 
this god again, just as he does to be in the presence of the perfectly real beings, but that 
this, also, is not something which he can achieve in this life.  He will thus set out to 
regain as much of his former perfection and closeness to the real beings and his god as is 
possible in this world, by emulating his god and pursuing insight into the nature of the 
real beings to whatever extent is possible for an embodied human being, perhaps with 
hopes, ultimately, of reclaiming his former existence.   
 To speak in this way of different kinds of perfection may seem strange, in a 
Platonic context, but we must keep in mind that the ‘perfection’ we are speaking of here 
is not the true or complete perfection possessed by the perfectly real beings.  Rather, it is 
the greatest perfection, the closest approximation to true perfection, we might say, which 
it is possible for souls to achieve.  And this degree of perfection, it seems, is the greatest 
perfection achievable by any being within the bounds of heaven.76  But if the perfection 
of the gods is only an approximation to complete perfection, the greatest possible 
perfection achievable for souls, then it is only a certain degree of perfection which the 
gods possess, and there will always be some extent to which even the gods are lacking.  It  
becomes plausible, then, even on Plato’s view, that this same degree of perfection might 
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be achievable in various ways.77 Each of the gods, then, would represent one of the 
possible ways in which a soul might most closely approximate true perfection, one of the 
ways in which a soul, to some extent inevitably imperfect by its very nature, might come 
to be as perfect as a soul can be.
 In its un-embodied life in heaven, it then seems, the soul desired to be close to 
perfection in at least three ways.  First, it desired to be in the presence of the perfectly 
real beings, which embody a complete perfection of a kind unachievable for itself, but the 
understanding of which strengthened and fortified it to maintain itself in the most perfect 
state which was possible for it.  Second, it desired to be in the presence of its god, the 
embodiment and example of the most perfect state which a soul of its own disposition 
could possibly achieve.  And third, it desired to make itself as much like its god as it 
could, to actually become as perfect as its own disposition could possibly allow.  All of 
these aspirations of our un-embodied souls appear to be closely connected on Plato’s 
account; each kind of ‘closeness’ to perfection enables the furtherance and persistence of 
the others.  However, there is no obvious priority among them.  Do our souls, and those 
of the gods, desire to behold the perfectly real beings because this will strengthen them 
and keep them in their most perfect state as they go about the rest of their existence 
within heaven?  Or do they desire to be strengthened in soul and as perfect as possible 
because this is what will allow them to continue to behold the perfectly real beings?  Do 
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they desire to follow their god because this will help them to perfect their own souls?  Or 
do they desire to perfect their own souls, at least in part, because this will allow them to 
follow their god more closely?  Aspects of the myth seem to hint at any or all of these 
answers.  And it seems important, for this point, that the souls who attain the rim of 
heaven and behold the real beings outside do not remain in this state of beatific vision 
indefinitely.  Although the ‘divine banquet’ is a deeply ecstatic experience for all of the 
souls, it does not exhaust their existence, nor is it the final aim of their existence, towards 
which they strive until it is achieved, and in which they then remain.  Their ‘home’ is 
within heaven, and their proper “work”78 is here.  The answer to these questions, then, is 
not at all obvious.
 The fact that the answer is not obvious, however, may give us some helpful 
insight into the experience of the lover.  Having come to understand these three desires in 
himself, to be in the presence of the real beings, to be in the presence of his god, and to 
be in his own most perfect possible un-embodied state, through emulation of his god, he 
has also come to understand that none of these desires can be fully satisfied in his current, 
embodied, life.  Each of these desires, however, has an analogue in his current, embodied, 
life, and he will now recognize that he pursues these desires as the closest possible 
approximation to the joys of his un-embodied life here in this world.  As each of these 
three aspects of his former existence were interconnected and mutually supporting, but 
were nevertheless to some extent distinct and independent sources of joy and satisfaction 
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in his un-embodied life, each of which he desired and pursued, so too are their analogues 
in this world.  And while he now knows that, in the long run, his greatest desire is to 
regain these pleasures of his former life in heaven, he may also pursue their analogues 
here on earth for the independent sake of the similar joy and satisfaction they provide 
him, and not only instrumentally.  The lover may pursue recollection of the perfect 
beings, then, not only as a means to regaining his former life in heaven, but because the 
experience of this recollection is the closest thing possible in this life to the joy of 
beholding them directly in his former one.79  He will attempt to make his soul as much 
like that of his god as possible, despite being separated from much of his own ‘divine’ 
nature by being bound up with a physical body, “locked in it like an oyster in its shell,”80 
not only because this might ultimately help him to regain his original state, but because 
this is the way of life that will allow him to be at his best and most contented with his 
own condition while he remains ‘down here.’  And, he will seek out closeness and 
intimacy with another human being who is like his god in character, not only because this 
may help him in his own process of emulating, and perhaps ultimately regaining his place 
beside, the god, but because this nearness to another soul which is like his god’s is the 
closest joy which he can have in this life to his former nearness to the god himself.  And 
so Plato describes the lover as seeing his beloved, in the beginning, as to some extent a 
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proxy for his god, treating him “like his very own god, building him up and adorning him 
as an image to honor and worship.”81
 So, here is an answer to at least a part of our previous question: if the lover is 
driven to pursue a beloved by his revelatory recollection of the true nature of beauty, then 
why does he seek out a beloved of a particular personality type, rather than simply the 
most beautiful beloved he can find?  There is only one Beauty, after all, not different 
types.  The answer seems to be that, although at first the lover is motivated only by a 
confused desire to be near that which is beautiful, after his experience of recollection of 
the perfect beings, his desires have broadened.  While he still desires to be in the presence 
of someone beautiful, his aims have changed more than is explained only by his new 
understanding of what beauty really is.  He now, with his newfound insight into his 
former life in heaven, has discovered an additional desire: to be near someone who is like 
his god.  He now seeks out a beloved, then, who is both of these things, both beautiful in 
soul and body and of a character like that of his god.  But another part of our question 
remains unanswered: if the lover is driven by a desire to be near someone who is like his 
god, then why would he choose a beloved who displayed the mere potential to be like his 
god, rather than searching for the most perfect example of this personality type that he 
could find?
 The answer to this part of our question seems slightly more complicated.  We 
have said that the lover desires, now, two different but related things: to be close to that 
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which is beautiful, and to be close to a soul like that of his god.  That beauty with which 
he is most concerned now is not physical beauty, however, but spiritual or psychological 
beauty, the beauty of the beloved’s soul.  Combining these two concerns, then, and setting 
aside for the moment the interest which the lover does still retain, to some extent, in the 
physical beauty of his beloved, we might say that the lover now desires to be close to a 
soul which is beautiful in a specific way, that is, in that way of which his own god is the 
most perfect example.  We might say, then, that the lover desires to be close to a certain 
kind of beauty of soul.  The beauty of souls, however, unlike the beauty of bodies, is not 
directly perceptible through the senses.82  Physical proximity alone, then, will not be 
enough to reliably bring the lover into contact with this kind of beauty, in the way that it 
was enough to give him access to the physical beauty of the beloved through his faculty 
of sight.  To be close to the beauty of the beloved’s soul, then, the lover must find a way 
to gain some sort of access to the beloved’s soul or mind, and to do this reliably would 
seem to require the trust and confidence of the beloved, a willingness on his part to share 
his thoughts and experiences, to more intimately and fully reveal the contents and the 
character of his soul to the lover.  And with his newfound insight into the nature of both 
Beauty and the soul, the lover will presumably be able to realize this.  The sort of 
closeness he desires, then, is no longer the sort of thing which the lover might have any 
hope of achieving solely through his own initiative, without the consent and assistance of 
the beloved.  And so the lover must find a beloved who not only displays the kind of 
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beauty of soul to which he hopes to be near, but who is also willing to share that beauty 
with him, to trust him with a nearness to his soul, by giving him access, in a suitable 
sense, to his inner self and life.
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IV. Pedagogical Love
 But what would move the beloved, initially, to do this?  The lover is motivated in 
his pursuit of the beloved by the desire he has to be close to the kind of soul which he 
believes the beloved to have, but what is to motivate the beloved to allow, and even to 
actively promote, such closeness between them?  Plato’s account of this initial stage of 
the relationship from the perspective of the beloved is somewhat vague in the Phaedrus, 
up until the point at which the beloved himself in turn falls in love with the lover.  And by 
this point in the relationship, it seems, there must already be an established degree of 
closeness and non-physical intimacy between the lover and the beloved.  What initially 
moves the beloved to allow the lover a place in his life, it seems, is the recognition by the 
beloved that the lover genuinely desires to help him and to offer him some good or 
benefit.  “Because he is served with all the attentions due a god by a lover..., and because 
he is by nature disposed to be a friend of the man who is serving him... as time goes 
forward he is brought... to a point where he lets the man spend time with him.”83  And 
once he has allowed the lover to spend time with him, and begun to engage with him in 
conversation and joint activities, he comes to realize how deeply the lover desires not 
only to be near him, but to help and to benefit him.  “Now that he allows his lover to talk 
and spend time with him, and the man’s good will is close at hand, the boy is amazed by 
it as he realizes that all the friendship he has from his other friends and relatives put 
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together is nothing compared to that of this friend who is inspired by a god.”84  Notice, 
here, the increased reliance on the language of philia, as opposed to eros, in this passage 
addressing the development of the relationship from the perspective of the beloved.  This 
is a point to which we will return again shortly.  For now, though, we see that it seems the 
beloved is initially drawn to the lover by the realization that the lover genuinely desires, 
and, perhaps, to some extent is actually able, to benefit him and offer him help.  There is 
an extent, then, to which the beloved is initially drawn to the lover by just what one might 
be led to expect by a more traditional Greek understanding of the dynamic within such 
relationships: the expectation of some benefit to himself.
  And this is in line with much of what we see brought forward in Plato’s 
arguments in the Lysis, where one of the central troubles driving the aporia seems to be 
the question of how it can be possible for both parties to a friendship to benefit one 
another, when the capacity to offer benefit seems, on the face of it, to imply a position of 
superiority, at least in that respect in which the benefit is offered.85  It is a central element 
of Plato’s arguments in the Lysis that friends must be of benefit, or ‘useful,’ to one 
another.  To him it seems, on the face of it, however, that “like is useless to like insofar as 
they are alike.  And to admit that the useless is a friend would strike a sour note.”86  If the 
friends are to benefit one another, then, it seems initially as though the benefits they offer 
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one another must be different.  Moreover, this discussion of friendship in the Lysis is 
dramatically nested within a discussion of eros.  The dialogue with Lysis is conducted at 
least partially for the benefit of his hapless lover, as a lesson from Socrates in how to 
“carry on a conversation with him instead of talking and singing the way... you’ve been 
doing,”87 and so, presumably, to more successfully engage his attention.  And if there is 
any conclusion in the Lysis which seems to be taken seriously as a culmination of the 
dialogue, it is not one about friendship in general, but about its specific application within 
erotic relationships, the claim that“the genuine and not pretended lover must be 
befriended by his boy.”88  This question, then, of how the parties to a relationship are to 
benefit one another unless each is offering something in which the other is “deficient,”89 
along with the presumption that one cannot offer to another something in which one is 
equally ‘deficient’ oneself, seems to be treated as an equally important and thorny 
problem in the specific case of erotic love.  If “a thing desires what it is deficient in,”90 it 
seems initially, then that which the lover desires in or from the beloved, and that which 
the beloved desires in or from the lover (if, indeed, the beloved feels desire toward the 
lover at all) must be different, and the traditional view of such relationships as essentially 
asymmetric is maintained.  If this really is the case for the lover and beloved, though, 
Plato’s argument in the Lysis implies, then it is so for reasons which apply equally well to 
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all friendships.  And the claim that all friendships are essentially asymmetric, especially 
in the strong way in which erotic relationships have been traditionally conceived of as 
being, looks quite a bit more difficult to swallow.  This again, though, is a point to which 
we will later return.  For now, let’s focus on the emphasis which the Lysis places, here 
and elsewhere, on the thought that in order for the lover to gain the beloved’s affection, to 
be ‘befriended by his boy,’ he must be able to offer the beloved some benefit which the 
beloved will recognize as such.  What sort of a benefit could we expect this to be, in the 
context of Plato’s account in the Phaedrus?
 Given the lover’s newfound focus on the goods of the soul and the world of the 
gods and the perfectly real beings, and consequent understanding of love as, at least in 
large part, an avenue for honoring and pursuing these goods, it seems reasonable to think 
that he would search for a beloved who would likewise value, or at least be strongly 
inclined to value, these same sorts of goods.  And, given Plato’s view of human virtue, it 
seems likely that in searching for a beautiful soul, of whatever sort, he would be 
searching for a soul who would also value such goods highly.  In attempting to offer some 
benefit to his beloved, then, as a way of winning his trust and affection, it seems 
reasonable to think that the lover would want this benefit to be of the sort which a 
beautiful soul would think valuable.  The beloved’s appreciation of a lover’s generosity 
with less genuinely admirable goods, perhaps even such unworthy ones as the money or 
social advancement which seem to be promised (but rarely delivered) by the lovers 
condemned in Socrates’ and Lysias’ earlier speeches, would display a conspicuous 
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deficiency in the very qualities of soul to which the ‘genuine’ lover is most attracted in a 
beloved.  A beloved’s receptivity to benefits of this sort from a prospective lover, then, 
might be a strong indication to the lover in search of a beautiful soul that he had chosen 
his beloved unwisely.  The sort of benefits which such a lover could be expected to offer 
his beloved, then, in order to initially attract his attention and gain his trust, would seem 
most likely to be benefits to the beloved’s soul, and in particular to those aspects of his 
soul which the lover has come to see as most highly valuable: his personal virtue and 
philosophical understanding of the gods and the real beings.  In responding positively to 
the offer of such benefits, then, and perceiving their exceptional value, the beloved will 
only be further confirming his lover’s belief that he is indeed a beautiful soul, with his 
natural ability to recognize the truly valuable un-effaced by his time spent away from 
heaven. 
 And to be in a position to offer such benefits to the beloved in the development of 
his soul, it seems natural to think, the lover must pursue a beloved who is at least not 
significantly his own superior in these respects.  Since the lover himself, then, is still far 
from having achieved his hope of fully emulating his god, his beloved, likewise, if he is 
to attract him with the promise of benefit in this respect, must possess the potential for 
such an achievement, but not yet its full realization.  The lover’s search for a beloved, 
then, is constrained by two parameters upon the beloved’s degree of achievement with 
respect to the perfection of his soul: the lover’s desire for a beautiful soul will attract him 
to those of significant achievement with respect to virtue, while his desire for intimacy 
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with such a soul will drive him towards those whose degree of achievement is not so high 
as to place them beyond his own capacity to assist in this respect.  These opposite 
pressures, it seems, one providing a lower and one an upper limit upon the realized virtue 
of the beloved, will drive him towards the pursuit of a beloved with a degree of virtue 
roughly similar to his own.  To a soul in this condition, the philosophical and 
psychological insight which the lover has recently gained through his experience of love 
will present a significant and attractive benefit, an advantage in the pursuit of virtue 
which the beloved does not yet share, and one which may allow the lover to win his 
attention and trust.
 At this intermediate stage of the relationship, then, in which the beloved has 
accepted the lover’s advances, and admitted him into a trusted place among his social 
intimates, but does not yet return his love, the relationship between the two is still 
broadly pedagogical.  The lover relies upon the insight love has granted him into the 
nature of their god, the real beings, and souls like their own to guide the beloved in his 
nascent emulation of that god and pursuit of philosophy and virtue.  The benefits which 
each receives, in turn, remain very different: the beloved receives the lover’s assistance in 
pursuing greater wisdom and virtue, while the lover receives (primarily) the pleasure of 
closeness to the beloved’s burgeoning spiritual beauty.  Already at this stage in the 
relationship, then, the benefits which love has brought to both parties are considerable.  
The frenzy and discomfort which eros had initially induced in the lover have been 
soothed and assuaged by the combination of his own increased understanding and 
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psychological discipline and his success in attaining some physical and psychological 
intimacy with the object of his desire.  The more disturbing signs of ‘madness’ which had 
marked his initial experience of love  have been replaced by a level of contentment with 
these achievements, and enjoyment of the company of his beautiful beloved.  For the 
beloved’s part, it seems, such a relationship is likely to be both educationally rewarding 
and socially unburdensome.  Lovers of this sort “show no envy, no mean-spirited lack of 
generosity, toward the boy, but make every possible effort to draw him into being totally 
like themselves and the god to whom they are devoted,”91 and so the beloved will find 
himself with much to gain, and little of importance to lose.  A relationship which never 
progressed beyond this stage, perhaps, would be nothing to be ashamed of, as the 
‘madness’ of love, thus properly pursued by the lover, has already brought much benefit 
to both parties, and done little harm, if any, to either.  Crucially, though, a love which 
never progressed beyond this stage would still have fallen far short of providing the 
‘greatest benefit’ to the lover and beloved of which Plato argues that love is capable.  
And, perhaps even more crucially, at this stage the lover has done very nearly everything 
he can to respond to his experience of love correctly.  If the relationship which he now 
shares with his beloved is to offer its fullest benefit to either one of them, this further 
development is no longer in his hands.  The success of their love now depends not 
primarily upon the lover’s agency, but on that of the beloved.
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V. The Beloved Becomes a Lover
 If all goes as it ideally should between the lover and beloved, then after they have 
spent some time together in this sort of a relationship, the lover guiding and assisting the 
beloved, and the beloved rewarding him with affection and social intimacy, the beloved, 
in turn, will find himself unexpectedly stuck by his own transformational experience of 
eros:  
 Think how a breeze or an echo bounces back from a smooth solid object to its source; that is how 
 the stream of beauty goes back to the beautiful boy and sets him aflutter.  It enters through his 
 eyes, which are its natural rout to the soul; there it waters the passages for the wings, starts the 
 wings growing, and fills the soul of the loved one with love in return.92
Just as the lover initially was, then, the beloved is taken off guard by a sudden 
confrontation with the seemingly disproportionate power which beauty has over him.  
Unlike the lover’s, however, the beloved’s shocking experience of beauty is not elicited 
directly by a sensory encounter with an ‘image’ of beauty in one of the ‘things down 
here,’ but is in some crucial sense mediated by his existing relationship with the lover.  
The beauty which he thus encounters, moreover, is not just any beauty, or even the beauty 
of the lover himself,93 but in some sense an ‘echo,’ or reflection of the beloved’s own 
beauty, which he seems to have previously taken little notice of.  And, though it is the 
beloved’s own beauty he sees, he is initially unable to recognize himself in it.  This 
experience of beauty, then, is every bit as maddening and disorienting for him as it was 
for his lover.  “The boy is in love, but he has no idea what he loves.  He does not know, 
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93 Or, at least not only the beauty of the lover.  More on this difficult point later.
and cannot explain, what has happened to him.... He does not realize that he is seeing 
himself in the lover as in a mirror.”94
 If he too responds to his love correctly, it seems, this experience of confronting 
his own beauty in the ‘mirror’ of the lover will lead him along a precisely similar journey 
of revelatory recollection and psychological self-development.  Just as the lover was, he 
now finds himself overwhelmed by the urge to be close to the seeming possessor of this 
earthly beauty, the lover who has made this beauty visible to him.  Just as the lover did, 
he finds relief for his frenzied state of soul only in the presence of his beloved other.  “So, 
when the lover is near, the boy’s pain is relieved... and when they are apart he yearns as 
much as he is yearned for, because he has a mirror image of love in him – ‘backlove’ – 
though he neither speaks nor thinks of it as love, but as friendship.”95  And just as the 
lover was, he is at first inclined to misinterpret this violent attraction as a primarily 
physical desire, driven by the desperate need he feels to be close to that which nourishes 
the wings of his soul, and by the unenlightened urgings of his own ‘bad horse,’ to mistake 
sexual intercourse for the most suitable way to calm his inner turmoil.  Afforded easy 
access to the lover by their well established social relationship, moreover, he now faces a 
much less significant practical barrier to acting on these urgings than the lover had 
initially found.  In the throes of the first frenzy of erotic madness “he wants to see, touch, 
kiss, and lie down with”96 the lover, and with few external circumstances to impede his 
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path toward doing so “of course, as you might expect, he acts on these desires soon after 
they occur.”97  The beloved’s first encounter with eros, then, is in some ways even more 
precarious than that of the lover, insofar as the immediate accessibility of his beloved 
other provides him with an even greater opportunity to go astray in his interpretation of 
what is happening to him.  Without an enforced passage of time between the dizzying 
onset of erotic symptoms and the practical possibility of a sexual encounter with the 
desired individual, provided in the lover’s case by the need for an extended seduction, the 
beloved seems in even greater danger of reacting unreflectively to his desire, forgoing the 
opportunity to be reminded of the world of the gods and the perfectly real beings in favor 
of the far easier path of surrendering to pleasure like a ‘four-footed beast.’
 And this, in turn, provides a new temptation for the lover as well.  “When they are 
in bed, the lover’s undisciplined horse has a word to say to the charioteer – that after all 
its sufferings it is entitled to a little fun.”98  After all that he has done to tame the bad 
horse in his soul, then, to bring it into harmony with the good horse, under the control of 
the charioteer, the lover is now likely to find himself in a position where all external 
barriers to taking an action which he rationally recognizes as harmful to both his beloved 
and the long-term well-being of their relationship with one another have been removed.  
In his own confused struggle to understand the effect that eros is having on him, the 
beloved is still painfully torn between the pull of the bad horse in his soul and that of the 
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good horse, and given, in addition, the faith which he has in the lover’s desire to do him 
good, may be easily swayed by attempts that the lover might make to initiate more 
serious sexual activity.  At this critical point in their relationship, then, the beloved is 
uniquely vulnerable to harm by a moment of weakness on the part of the lover.  “The 
boy’s bad horse has nothing to say, but swelling with desire, confused, it hugs the lover 
and kisses him in delight at his great good will.  And whenever they are lying together it 
is completely unable, for its own part, to deny the lover any favor he might beg to 
have.”99  The beloved’s bad horse, however, is far from the dominant force in his soul.  
Just as it had in the lover’s case, the increased proximity to his beloved other provokes 
not only a greater intensity in the straining of the bad horse, but also a powerful counter-
reaction.  The charioteer in the beloved’s soul, with the good horse under its command as 
an ally, will resist the urgings of the bad horse in his soul, and, if sufficiently strong, even 
the misguided pleadings of a briefly faltering lover, overcoming the forces of both these 
internal and external challenges “with modesty and reason.”100
 The lover and beloved, then, are now both battling the bad horses in their 
respective souls.  Although the lover has already done much to tame his bad horse, it 
seems, so that it no longer attempts to overpower the good horse and the charioteer by 
sheer force, as it did in its initial drive towards sex with the beloved, it has not fallen 
silent in attempts to persuade the charioteer to indulge it.  This sort of influence by the 
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bad horse, though perhaps more subtle, may be even more dangerous, insofar as the 
charioteer, if mistakenly persuaded, has the power to direct the good horse into 
cooperation as well.  Should the bad horse succeed in misleading the charioteer, then, it 
seems there will be nothing left in the soul to combat it.  The beloved, in turn, has still to 
fight both battles with the bad horse in his soul, to restrain it by countervailing force into 
submission as the lover initially had, and to learn to reject its more subtle pleadings for 
complicity by his charioteer, before he can be confident that he has overcome its 
influence sufficiently for the success of his love.  As this common psychological struggle 
continues, if it is to be successful, then at some point in the development of their now 
mutual love the two parties will find themselves approaching a position of parity.  Each 
now both loves and desires the other, and each is engaged in an equivalent process of 
spiritual and psychological self-development which requires a growing philosophical 
knowledge of their own nature and the nature of the goods at which their eros aims in 
order to succeed.  At first the lover, already some way along this path of self-
development, may be able to assist the beloved in his own struggle against his bad horse, 
but eventually the beloved will catch up with him along this path, and by the time that 
they have both succeeded in this struggle, they will find themselves in a roughly 
equivalent position.  The advantage in insight which the lover initially enjoyed, by virtue 
of his revelatory experience of love, will be gradually effaced by the beloved’s own 
progression through this same revelatory experience.  If both are successful in their 
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response to love, then, “if the victory goes to the better elements in both their minds,”101 
then the fundamental asymmetry of their relationship will be dissolved.  The distinction 
between their roles as lover and beloved will become a primarily historical (and perhaps 
social/conventional) one, with little importance for the continuing dynamic within their 
relationship.
 And such a relationship will, Plato makes a point to emphasize, continue, not just 
until the fury of passion has run its course, but throughout both parties’ lives, and even 
into the afterlife.  Having mutually conquered the influence of their respective bad 
horses, under what one might imagine to be some of the most challenging circumstances 
possible, the pair of lovers “are modest and fully in control of themselves, now that they 
have enslaved the part that brought trouble into the soul and set free the part that gave it 
virtue.”102  This better part of their souls, in turn, “will lead them to follow the assigned 
regimen of philosophy”103 in the remainder of their lives together, and if they do this, 
then “their life here below is one of bliss and shared understanding.”104  Notice here, that 
Plato is no longer speaking of two lives, but of one.  The lovers who have come this far, it 
seems, will share not only understanding, but everything which is important to the 
definition of a life.  From this point forward they will share not only time and activities, 
but in some important sense have a single life in common.  And this shared life will be 
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one of a sort which Plato has already claimed in his analogical myth will bring them the 
greatest possible achievement for an earthly human being: 
 No soul returns to the place from which it came for ten thousand years, since its wings will not 
 grow before then, except for the soul of a man who practices philosophy without guile or who 
 loves boys philosophically.  If, after the third cycle of one thousand years, the last mentioned souls 
 have chosen such a life three times in a row, they grow their wings back, and they depart in the 
 three-thousandth year.105
To ‘love boys philosophically,’ it seems, is an obvious candidate for what the palinode 
has just been explaining to us how to do.  By the end of this explanation, however, it 
seems we have come to a potentially surprising conclusion: that it is not specifically 
loving boys philosophically which grants this great benefit, but loving philosophically, at 
all.  There seems little sense in which the original beloved of our “philosophical pair”106 
could be plausibly considered a paiderastes, philosophical or otherwise.  However, an 
early regrowth of the wings of the soul is now claimed equally for him.  The pair of 
philosophical lovers, “after death... have grown wings and become weightless, they have 
won the first of three rounds in these, the true Olympic Contests.  There is no greater 
good than this that either human self-control or divine madness can offer a man.”107  This 
then, is the ‘greatest good fortune’ which Socrates has set out to argue that love, properly 
followed, will ensure, a benefit won equally by both ‘a lover and his boy.’
 Somewhat surprisingly, however, the palinode’s account of love does not end 
here.  Even for those who ultimately fail to ‘follow the assigned regimen of philosophy,’ a 
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love which has come this far will have created a powerful and lasting bond between the 
parties: 
 If... they adopt a lower way of living, with ambition in place of philosophy, then pretty soon when 
 they are careless..., the pair’s undisciplined horses will catch their souls off guard and together 
 bring them to commit that act which ordinary people would take to be the happiest choice of all; 
 and when they have consummated it once, they go on doing this for the rest of their lives....  So 
 these two also live in mutual friendship (though weaker than that of the philosophical pair), both 
 while they are in love and after they have passed beyond it.108
And this pair, too, will have won a great reward by their love, though, again, not as great 
as that of the ‘philosophical pair:’ “In death they are wingless when they leave the body, 
but their wings are bursting to sprout, so the prize the have won from the madness of love 
is considerable.”109  Moreover, even in death they will remain together, and be jointly 
granted a happy afterlife as a consequence of their success in love: “those who have 
begun the sacred journey in lower heaven may not by law be sent into darkness for the 
journey under the earth; their lives are bright and happy as they travel together, and 
thanks to their love they will grow wings together when the time comes.”110  Though this 
pair has failed to win the great reward reserved for philosophers and those who love 
philosophically, then, and so it seems that they will have to wait at least the full ten 
lifetimes to reclaim their wings, they are nevertheless to be seen as having gained some 
advantage with respect to this aim, because of the love that they share.  And this is an 
advantage which is not to be gained by those who respond to their experience of eros in a 
way which does not lead to the forging of such lasting and mutual bonds, even when it 
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does lead to an otherwise rewarding and even constructively virtuous relationship, as in 
the case of the broadly ‘pedagogical’ pairing we discussed before.  Moreover, the 
advantage thus gained by these lovers is not only cast in terms the acquisition of a more 
blessed afterlife, this blessedness itself is in turn closely linked with the fact that the 
journey they take there is no longer taken alone.  It seems that the advantage which this 
lesser pair of lovers gains, then, both in the afterlife and in their more ideal position with 
respect to regrowing their wings, may not only be caused by the lasting and mutual 
friendship which keeps them together through life and the afterlife, but perhaps at least 
partially constituted by that friendship as well.
 And it is here that Socrates abruptly ends his palinode to love, with a description 
of the benefits not of the highest kind of eros, but of this ‘second best’ sort of 
relationship, and a reminder that the speech has been directed, hypothetically, not to an 
aspiring lover, but to a prospective beloved.  “These are the rewards you will have from a 
lover’s friendship, my boy, and they are as great as divine gifts should be.”111  The 
implication seems to be, then, that even though this lesser pair of lovers does not gain the 
‘greatest good fortune’ with which love is capable of providing us, they have nevertheless 
gained more than enough to make all of their struggles and great risks worthwhile.  
Despite acknowledging the serious risks of being badly led astray by one’s own ‘bad 
horse’ in the earlier stages of love, that is, as well as the potentially dangerous effects that 
love may have on the behavior of an unworthy lover, and even given the likelihood that 
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both parties may still fail to love ‘philosophically’ even after the most dramatic battles in 
their wars with their respective bad horses have been won, Socrates is nevertheless 
recommending this arduous process to the beloved whole-heartedly, as one well worth 
undertaking.  
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VI. How Love Moves the Beloved
 It seems that we must now ask, again, then, what exactly we should take to have 
happened to the beloved, now himself become a lover, in the course of this process of 
falling in love.  What are we to make of the development of this ‘mirror image of love’ in 
the beloved, as Plato has described it to us here?  The first question to ask in this respect 
would seem to be how we are to understand Plato’s claim that it is in some sense the 
beloved’s own beauty which triggers his initial experience of love, in light of the further 
claim that this beauty is mediated, in some crucial way, by the person or presence of his 
lover.  There seem to be several obvious candidates for how we might interpret this claim. 
First, from the suggestion that ‘the stream of beauty’ ‘enters through his eyes,’ we might 
infer that the beauty in question is of a literally visible, that is, physical, sort.  The claim 
would then be that it is the beloved’s encounter with his own physical beauty, facilitated 
in some way by his lover, that touches off his experience of eros.  There are several 
reasons why this version of the claim should strike us as implausible, however.  
Remember, first of all, what it is about physical beauty that makes it so uniquely suited to 
elicit an erotic response: the fact that it “alone has this privilege, to be the most clearly 
visible”112 of all the ‘images’ we can encounter of the real beings here on earth.  And the 
‘visibility’ in question here, importantly, is literal, not figurative.  It is because we can, 
unexpectedly, catch literal sight of an ‘image’ of Beauty as we go about our daily lives, 
experiencing a shock of recognition as this ‘image’ confronts us through “the sharpest of 
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our bodily senses,”113 that the ‘beauty down here,’ as opposed to the many less literal 
‘images’ of the other perfect beings, is most likely to provoke an unsought for experience 
of recollection in our souls.  And this link with direct perceptibility, it seems, is the only 
advantage that physical beauty enjoys in this respect.  Were physical beauty in any way 
more intrinsically lovable than, or even, perhaps, as lovable as, the other earthly ‘images’ 
of beauty, it seems, and, more specifically, than spiritual or psychological beauty in 
particular, then the transformation in focus which the lover’s initial attraction to his 
beloved undergoes upon his dawning awareness of Beauty’s true nature would be 
prevented.  Moreover, even beauty as such, physical and otherwise, it seems, is not 
intrinsically more suited to serve as a spark for eros than are the earthly ‘images’ of other 
perfect beings, except insofar as it enjoys this advantage with respect to direct 
perceptibility: “It would awaken a terribly powerful love if an image of wisdom came 
through our sight as clearly as beauty does, and the same goes for the other objects of 
inspired love.”114  No such direct perception of an earthly ‘image’ of wisdom (or virtue, 
or self control, etc.) is possible, however.  These qualities of soul, like souls themselves, 
it seems, can only be inferred from our direct perceptions of physical bodies.  If the 
beauty which touched off the beloved’s overpowering experience of eros were physical 
beauty, then, it seems that this beauty would need to be something he perceived directly, 
though his bodily senses.  But in what way could the lover facilitate such a direct sensory 
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encounter between the beloved and his own physical beauty, which would make any 
sense of the description Plato gives us of his role in the beloved’s experience of eros?  
The imagery here is of an indirect encounter with the earthly beauty he confronts: an 
echo, reflection, or ricochet.  This beauty ‘bounces back’ to the beloved, with whom it 
had originated, from the lover who had first been struck by it.  Since the lover, 
presumably, does not literally reflect back an image, then, the talk of ‘seeing’ in this 
context seems best taken as figurative.  If this beauty is not literally seen by the beloved, 
though, it seems best taken not to be physical beauty, given that, aside from its advantage 
in direct perceptibility, physical beauty is in fact less suited to touch off an experience of 
recollection, and so eros, than are those non-physical ‘images’ of beauty which more 
closely resemble Beauty itself.
 The most likely candidate for the beauty the beloved experiences in this way, 
then, is not beauty of the body, but of the soul.  And given Plato’s claim that this is the 
beloved’s own beauty, reflected back to him in some way by the lover, it seems safe to 
assume that it is in some sense the beauty of the beloved’s own soul.  But what are we to 
make of this claim that the beloved somehow ‘sees’ the beauty of his own soul ‘in the 
lover’ in this indirect way?  Given what we have already said of the relationship between 
the lover and beloved up until this point, there seem to be at least two fairly obvious 
readings we might give of this claim.  First, we might emphasize the talk of the lover as a 
‘mirror’ of the beloved’s beauty over the claim that this beauty is the beloved’s own in a 
highly particular sense, and recall that the process of falling in love we have traced on the 
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part of the lover has ensured a high degree of similarity between the souls of the lover 
and beloved. 115  If the lover has chosen his beloved wisely, we have argued, then the 
beloved’s soul will be very much like that of the lover along both of the axes according to 
which Plato has argued that souls are divided into general types.  In searching for a soul 
like that of his god, the lover will have sought out a beloved of the same unchanging 
character type as his own, as determined by ‘the god in whose chorus he danced’ before 
his birth into this world.  And in searching for a soul which is not already so 
accomplished in virtue as to be beyond his own ability to aid in this respect, while 
already as beautiful as he is capable of winning given this constraint imposed by his own 
worthiness as a suitor, he will have sought out a beloved whose degree of 
accomplishment in the development of his soul is relatively comparable to his own.  As 
the beloved comes to know the lover well, then, through the time they spend together and 
their many conversations with each other, both philosophical and otherwise, he will come 
to know a soul which is in many of the most important ways very much like his own.  In 
coming to know the lover well, then, the beloved is coming to know a soul whose beauty 
closely ‘mirrors’ his own, in both type and degree.  Remember, moreover, that the lover’s 
own spiritual and psychological development has already been greatly improved beyond 
that which he had achieved prior to his ‘possession’ by eros by the philosophical insight 
and internal struggle towards self-discipline and understanding which have been required 
of him by his experience of love thus far.  There is a sense in which, then, the current 
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beauty of the lover’s soul is not only a mirror image of the beloved’s, but its causal 
consequence as well, insofar as it is the effect that the beauty of the beloved’s soul has 
had on him which has caused him to develop his own soul to the extent that he currently 
has.  This relationship of both similarity and causal dependency between the beauty of the 
lover’s soul and that of the beloved’s, then, would seem to give us a plausible reading for 
both how the beloved could be said to see ‘himself in the lover as in a mirror,’ and how 
the beauty he saw there could be said to ‘bounce back’ to him as in some sense its 
original ‘source.’  On this reading, then, the earthly beauty which sets off the beloved’s 
experience of eros is primarily that which he finds in the soul of the lover, as he comes to 
know him well through their growing social intimacy, and is best seen as his own beauty 
only at the level of types, and by a strong analogy, through the close similarity between 
their two souls.
 Another plausible reading is available, however, and one which we may have 
reason to prefer, in the context of our overall reading of the Phaedrus.  If we emphasize, 
instead, the claim that the beauty in question is the beloved’s own, in a more particular 
sense, and treat the talk of ‘mirrors’ and ‘echoes’ as a somewhat more abstractly 
metaphorical description of the lover’s role in enabling this experience, another fairly 
obvious reading of how the beloved might come to confront this spiritual or 
psychological beauty is suggested by the nature of the ‘pedagogical’ relationship in which 
we have described the lover and beloved as already engaged.  Remember that among the 
chief benefits the lover has offered the beloved in order to attract his attentions and gain 
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his trust is assistance and direction in the development of his soul towards greater virtue, 
and so, greater beauty.  And it is in large part the insight the lover has gained into the 
nature of their common god and of human souls of the unchanging type that he and the 
beloved share which has allowed him to offer this guidance.  However, it seems that a 
general understanding of the various types of soul, both unchanging and qualitative, 
would be of relatively little use to him, either in offering this guidance to the beloved, or 
in the development of his own spiritual or psychological beauty, without at least some 
further understanding of the application of this general knowledge to the particular cases 
of himself and his beloved, the specific strengths and failings of his own and his 
beloved’s souls with respect to both their current qualitative type and their approximation 
to the ideal of the unchanging, ‘divine,’ type, at the emulation of which they ultimately 
aim.  Moreover, we have argued that in choosing a beloved the lover has sought out 
someone with a soul which he takes to fall within a relatively specific range of present 
development with respect to virtue and understanding.  And if he is to be correct in this 
assessment of his beloved’s current standing with respect to virtue, as it seems that he 
must, if their love is to be successful, this requires not only a general knowledge of the 
nature and types of souls, but an understanding of the particular features of this individual 
beloved’s soul, insofar as these cause and constitute strengths and weaknesses for the 
beloved with respect to his progress in virtue.116  And this is a theme we see taken up 
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elsewhere in the Phaedrus as well: if one is to expertly guide another soul in a given 
direction, it is not enough to know the destination at which one aims.  One must also 
understand the position from which the soul one hopes to guide begins, in order to know 
what words or actions will best serve to move that particular soul in the desired direction.  
 In the second half of the Phaedrus, where Socrates turns his attention to the topic 
of rhetoric, he argues that if there is any such thing as a true art of rhetoric it can only be 
the art of “directing the soul by means of speech, not only in the lawcourts and on other 
public occasions but also in private.”117  And to do this artfully, he argues, to direct the 
souls of others in a manner which is not haphazard, “empirical and artless,”118 but 
grounded in a true body of knowledge, and therefore reliably effective, will require 
careful study of the soul: “this is therefor the object towards which the speaker’s whole 
effort is directed, since it is in the soul that he attempts to produce conviction.”119  To 
artfully guide the souls of others towards conviction on a given topic, the true rhetorician 
must deploy a careful understanding of the psychology of his audience, not only of 
psychology in general, although he must have this, but also of the ways in which different 
souls vary, the various kinds of souls, and the ways in which each of them responds to the 
various kinds of speech, again, not only in general, but with respect to the given topic at 
hand, since, presumably, various kinds of soul will be more receptive to various sorts of 
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118 Phaedrus 270b6.
119 Phaedrus 271a1-3.
persuasion with respect to certain topics than to others.120  And in order to deploy this 
knowledge effectively, it is not enough for the rhetorician to possess it in the abstract; he 
must be able to reliably apply it to each of the individual souls to whom he has occasion 
to address himself: to “put his theory into practice and develop the ability to discern each 
kind clearly as it occurs in the actions of real life.”121  If he has learned his art well, then, 
he will “not only be able to say what kind of person is convinced by what kind of speech; 
on meeting someone he will be able to discern what he is like and make clear to himself 
that the person actually standing in front of him is of just this particular sort of 
character.”122  And all of this knowledge, both of theory and application, is required, if he 
is to artfully “direct the soul”123 of an individual he intends to persuade, whether in public 
or in private.  Moreover, Socrates argues, when such direction is done properly, with art, 
by someone who knows the truth about the topic on which he speaks, it can produce not 
only conviction in the souls of those so guided, but virtue as well.124  
 If the lover, then, during what we have called the ‘pedagogical’ stage of his 
relationship with the beloved, is engaged in a process of guiding the beloved towards 
both greater philosophical understanding and greater personal virtue, and, furthermore, if 
we may reasonably take philosophical understanding to at least partially involve the 
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121 Phaedrus 271d11-e2.
122 Phaedrus 271e3-2723.
123 Phaedrus 271d1.
124 Phaedrus 270b4-9.
acquisition of the proper convictions with respect to what is true, then he is engaged, at 
this point in their relationship, in an activity of which true rhetoric is the art: ‘directing 
the soul’ of his beloved ‘by means of speech’ in order to “impart to it the convictions and 
virtues”125 towards which he hopes for his beloved to aspire.  Of course, for him to be 
able to do this in the special case of his beloved will not require him to be in possession 
of the full art; one need not be a true rhetorician in order to succeed in love.  But what is 
broadly required in order to reliably guide any given soul in any given direction will 
presumably be the same in both cases: a knowledge of the topic at hand, and a knowledge 
of the soul to be so guided.  The true rhetorician possesses the art insofar as he is able to 
identify and know the type and nature of any soul with which he is presented, and so to 
reliable guide the soul of anyone he encounters in the way he desires with respect to any 
topic of which he has knowledge.  His knowledge of souls is exhaustive and general, and 
applicable in any given case.  The lover, on the other hand, need only be able to reliably 
guide one specific individual’s soul: that of his chosen beloved.  The knowledge of souls 
which he needs to accomplish his aim, then, in addition to an understanding of the nature 
of souls as such, and of human souls in general, need not extend to an exhaustive 
understanding of all of the various types of human souls and their manifestations in and 
interactions with the world.  He need only have this sort of detailed knowledge of the 
nature of a given soul and its likely responses in the case of the one specific soul which 
love requires him to successfully guide, the soul of his beloved.
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 The successful lover, then, in engaging in the project towards which love, at this 
stage of the relationship, directs him, attempting to guide his beloved towards a greater 
emulation of their common god, and so, a greater personal virtue and beauty of soul, will 
need to possess and correctly apply a careful understanding of his beloved’s soul, both as 
it currently is, and as it is capable, at its best, of becoming.  And a significant part of his 
doing this, it seems, given the way in which his own recent progress in virtue has been 
driven by his newfound insight into the nature of his own soul, both as it now is, and as it 
stands with respect to his god and its own most perfect possible state, will be an attempt 
to convey, to whatever extent he can, some portion of his insight into the nature of his 
beloved’s soul to the beloved himself.  In guiding the beloved towards a greater 
realization of his potential for virtue, it seems, the lover must, at least in part, be guiding 
him towards a greater understanding of his own soul and its beauty, both that which it 
already possesses, and that of which it is ultimately capable.  When the beloved comes to 
see ‘himself in the lover as in a mirror,’ then, in the course of this process, it seems 
natural to read what has happened to him in the following way: the lover, in articulating 
to the beloved the beauty and potential for beauty which he has come to ‘see’ in the 
beloved’s soul, the beauty which has led him to choose this particular individual as the 
one that he loves, out of all of ‘those who are beautiful,’ has succeeded in bringing the 
beloved to ‘see’ himself as the lover now ‘sees’ him, to understand the beauty of his own 
soul as the lover does.  On this second reading, then, it is this new insight into the beauty 
of his own soul which touches off the beloved’s revelatory recollection of true Beauty 
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and experience of eros: the beauty he confronts through the surprising glimpse into his 
own true nature afforded by his conversations with his lover.
 On either of these readings, then, we can see that the beloved begins his own 
progress through the course of eros not only from a position of somewhat heightened 
risk,126 but also one of relative advantage, compared with that of the original lover.  
While the lover had initially been moved to his recollection of true Beauty by an 
encounter with a physical ‘image’ of beauty in the world, the beloved’s own recollection 
is sparked by an encounter with an instance of beauty of soul, which already much more 
closely resembles true Beauty than physical beauty ever can.  Moreover, insofar as a 
perception of beauty of soul will already require some degree of intellectual grasp or 
understanding of the nature of that beauty, in order to recognize it as an ‘image’ of beauty 
at all, in contrast to the way in which physical beauty can simply strike one as such 
through the senses, completely unreflectively, the beloved will begin his own experience 
of love already armed with some portion of the philosophical resources for interpreting 
this experience correctly which the lover had been forced to develop for himself in the 
disorienting aftermath of his initial revelation.  The original lover himself, furthermore, 
so long as he maintains his hard-won control of the bad horse in his soul, will provide an 
additional resource on which the beloved can rely during his initial struggle to correctly 
interpret this experience, offering the beloved the benefit of the understanding gained 
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126 Subject as he is to a greater danger of acting precipitously upon his own sexual desires, both as a 
consequence of the immediate accessibility of his beloved other, and as a possible result of misplaced trust 
in the persuasions of a lover who has himself wavered in resisting the bad horse in his soul. See above, pp. 
41-43.
from his own recent struggle with the dizzying onset of love.  And once the beloved has 
successfully navigated the initial confusion which his revelatory recollection of Beauty 
has created in his soul, and been led by this process, as the lover was, to a new 
understanding of what his soul most centrally desires, he will find that he is already in 
possession, in the person of the lover, of a close social intimate who is ideally suited to 
satisfying his deep desire to be close to a soul which is beautiful in that way of which his 
god is the most perfect example.  For all of the same reasons for which the initiating 
lover, if he chose his beloved wisely, understood the beloved to be ideally suited to 
satisfying this desire in him, he is now himself equally suited to satisfying it in the 
beloved.  Moreover, the beloved will now have, as the lover initially did not, not only a 
beloved, in the person the original lover, who is capable of satisfying this driving desire 
in him, but also one who both understands and shares all of the other deepest desires 
which this process of love has brought him to recognize within himself.  Returning his 
attention to the things of this world, the beloved, now become a lover, will find that his 
lover, now become a beloved, is equally driven to pursue both the otherworldly desires 
which he has discovered in himself and the earthly analogues to them which are 
achievable within this life.  He will not only share these same desires, moreover, but will 
share the same understanding of them and his reasons for having them that the beloved, 
now a lover, has come to have, and so the same vision of himself and his soul, and his 
place in the wider order of the world and the heavens.  And, because this lover, now his 
beloved, also desires to lead his beloved, now a lover, towards the greatest possible 
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emulation of their shared god, and therefore to help him achieve his own greatest possible 
perfection of soul and philosophical recollection of the perfectly real beings, the lover, 
now beloved, not only desires all three of the same earthly aims for himself that the 
beloved, now a lover, has newly come to recognize as his own deepest earthly desires, 
but also desires them for the beloved.  The beloved, now lover, then, emerges from his 
transformative experience of the first shock of love to find, already waiting for him, a 
lover, now beloved, who is wholly devoted to helping him achieve what he has newly 
come to recognize as his own most deeply held earthly desires.127  And it is only at this 
point in their relationship, when the beloved has emerged from his struggle to interpret 
his experience of eros, having drawn the correct conclusions, and chooses, with the same 
self-awareness of what he most truly desires which the original lover had had in choosing 
him, to take the original lover as his own beloved, that the original lover comes to have as 
a partner in love that which the original beloved had already had from the beginning: 
another soul wholly devoted to helping him achieve his own greatest earthly good.
 At the beginning of their relationship, then, the lover desired the greatest possible 
goods of this life not only for himself, but also for his beloved, but the beloved did not 
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127 Or, at least, this is clearly so in the case of the first two such earthly desires: to recollect the perfect 
beings and to emulate his god. In the case of the third desire, to be close to another soul like that of his god, 
things seem slightly more complicated.  Given that the lover desires, 1) to be close to the beloved, and 2) to 
himself emulate their shared god as closely as possible, and, further, that the kind of closeness to the 
beloved which he now desires is reciprocal, requiring that the beloved should also be close to him, it will 
follow that the lover desires that at least one set of sufficient conditions for the satisfaction of this third 
desire of the beloved’s should obtain.  That is, in desiring that the beloved should be close to him, and that 
he himself should become a soul as much as possible like that of their shared god, the lover desires a state 
of affairs in which the beloved’s desire to be close to a soul like that of his god will be satisfied.  Whether 
this comes to the same thing is questionable, and the question has caused many difficulties in the 
philosophy of both friendship and love, but it seems reasonable, at least, in the present context, to treat the 
two as coming close enough for our purposes.  
yet desire these goods for the lover, and desired them even for himself only confusedly, 
insofar as he did already recognize both virtue and knowledge as goods worth acquiring.  
The lover, then, desired deeply that the beloved should have that which was in fact best 
for him,128 and which the beloved did, moreover, to some extent already desire for 
himself.  But the beloved did not, in return, desire that the lover should have that which 
was best for him, or even that the lover’s own desires should be satisfied.  After the 
beloved’s own experience of eros, however, this asymmetry in what each desires for the 
other has disappeared.  The beloved, turned lover, now both understands and desires that 
which is in fact best for him every bit as much as the lover, now beloved, initially did.  
The original lover, then, now desires that his beloved should have not only that which is 
objectively speaking best for him, as he has from the beginning, but also that which his 
beloved, now a lover, most deeply desires for himself, since what the original beloved 
most desires and what is in fact best for him will now coincide.  The original beloved, in 
turn, in desiring what is in fact best for his beloved, the original lover, now also desires 
that the original lover should have that which he most desires.  Each now desires for the 
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128 Again, though, the picture is in fact somewhat more complicated than this.  Although Plato’s later 
arguments seem clearly to assume that the lovers will desire what we have called the three ‘otherworldly’ 
goods for one another, as well as what we have called the three ‘earthly’ goods, none of the claims he 
explicitly makes seem to offer us arguments as to why this should be so.  Insofar as what we have called the 
‘earthly’ desires are not only analogous to the lovers’ ‘otherworldly’ aims, however, but are also 
instrumentally related to them, such that the full satisfaction of these ‘earthly’ desires would seem to imply 
the satisfaction of the ‘otherworldly’ ones, it again seems to be the case that by desiring that one another’s 
‘earthly’ desires should be satisfied the lovers are also desiring that the sufficient conditions for the 
satisfaction of their ‘otherworldly’ desires should obtain.  It may be, then, that Plato takes it to follow from 
the fact that the lovers desire the sufficient means to the satisfaction of one another’s ‘otherworldly’ desires 
that they also desire that these desires should be satisfied.  If this is so, however, then this is, again, a move 
which many contemporary readers might question.  For present purposes, however, I would like to set such 
questions to one side.
other to have, then, that which the other most desires for himself, and in doing so desires, 
both for himself and the other, that which is genuinely best. 
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VII. From Love to Friendship
 And, if one is a student of ancient philosophy, then all of this should be beginning 
to sound somewhat familiar.  The themes emerging here in the Phaedrus’ account of love 
are ones which play a central role in Aristotle’s well known discussions of friendship in 
both his Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics.  In the Rhetoric, Aristotle initially defines 
friendship in terms of one’s wishing one’s friends to have that which one believes to be 
good:
 We may describe friendly feeling towards any one as wishing for him what you believe to be good 
 things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these 
 things about.  A friend is one who feels thus and excites these feelings in return: those who think 
 they feel thus towards each other think themselves friends.129
As he elaborates upon this idea, however, it begins to seem clear that, on his considered 
view, it is not enough for friends to wish one another that which they believe to be good, 
in this way; they must also, at least to some extent, wish that which is actually good for 
one another. Someone who is your friend, he goes on to argue, “shares your pleasure in 
what is good, and your pain in what is unpleasant.”130  And, “since we all feel glad at 
getting what we wish for, and pained at getting what we do not,”131 a friend will wish for 
one to have one’s own wishes satisfied, when one wishes for that which is good.  Friends 
will also be those “to whom the same things are good and evil... for in that case they must 
have the same wishes, and thus by wishing for each other what they wish for themselves, 
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129 Aristotle. Rhetoric. Trans. W. Rhys Roberts. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Ed. Richard McKeon. (New 
York: Random House, 2001) 2.4 1380b35-1381a4.  Hereafter ‘Rhetoric.’
130 Rhetoric 2.4 1381a4-5.
131 Rhetoric 2.4 1381a7-8. 
they show themselves each other’s friends.”132  Although it seems ambiguous, here, 
whether those ‘to whom the same things are good and evil’ should be taken to mean those 
who believe the same things to be good and evil, or those for whom the same things are, 
in fact, good and evil, it seems that Aristotle intends to claim in the passage overall that 
those who are friends will be both of these things.  Our friends, he argues, will be those 
“who think the things good which we think good, so that they wish what is good for us; 
and this, as we saw, is what friends must do.”133  These arguments seem to assume, then, 
that there are, in fact, three things which our friends must wish for us: that which is good 
for us, that which they believe to be good for us, and that which we believe to be good for 
us.  And these three things must coincide, at least as a rule, if a friendship is to be 
practical.134  Only if they do coincide do the arguments given above plausibly follow.  If a 
friend ‘shares your pleasure in what is good,’ first of all, then it must be the case that you 
do take pleasure in that which is good.  And since ‘we all feel glad at getting what we 
wish for, and pained at getting what we do not,’ it must then be the case that you also 
wish for that which is good, since if you did not wish for it, then getting it would bring 
you pain, rather than pleasure.  And if your friend is to share this pleasure, then your 
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134 Or, at least, if a good friendship is.  It seems possible, given Aristotle’s vacillation elsewhere over 
whether, and to what extent, the vicious can be said to be friends, that he might accept the possibility of a 
‘friendship’ in which both parties shared the same false beliefs about what things were good for them.  
Such a friendship, however, would be harmful, rather than beneficial, to both parties, however well 
intentioned they might be in their actions towards each other.  And this sort of a harmful relationship does 
not seem to be what Aristotle has in mind when he typically speaks of friendship, or in his discussion of it 
here, since he seems generally to be committed to the position that friendship is both beneficial and a good.  
C.F. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe. (New York: Oxford U.P., 
2002.) 9.12 1171b37-1172a15.  Hereafter ‘Nicomachean Ethics.’
friend must also wish, as you do for yourself, that you should have that which is good.  
Insofar as you and your friend both wish for you to have what is good, then, the wishes 
you have for yourself and the wishes your friend has for you will coincide.  And, given 
Aristotle’s commitment to the claim that that which we wish for is that which we believe 
to be good, insofar as we wish for that which is in fact good, we will be correct in our 
beliefs about what is good.  Since our friends are those who wish us to have that which 
they believe to be good, then, and your friend wishes you to have that which you believe 
to be good, and that which you believe to be good is in fact good, your friend will also 
believe to be good that which is in fact so.  Without these intermediate steps, the final 
claim above, that it follows from the fact that we agree with our friends about what is 
good that our friends will ‘wish what is good for us’ seems like a non-sequitur.  If we 
supply the claim that our own beliefs about what is good for us are correct, however, we 
can begin to see how the argument is meant to follow.  The argument that friends will 
wish ‘for each other what they wish for themselves,’ then, seems to turn on a further 
claim: that that which is good for us will also be good for our friends.  And the thought 
behind this claim would seem to be something along the following lines.  We can all be 
safely assumed to wish for what we believe to be good for ourselves.  It has been argued 
that we will also wish for what we believe to be good for our friends.  If that which we 
believed to be good for ourselves, and that which we believed to be good for our friends 
were different, however, then these two wishes might easily come into conflict, and we 
would be forced to choose between pursuing our own perceived good and pursuing that 
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of our friends.  Such a divergence between what we took to be in our own interest and 
what we took to be in theirs, then, would threaten our mutual well-wishing and trust.  
And the same will be true of our friends’ beliefs about what is in their interest and in ours. 
It will follow, then, that if our friendship is to be a stable one, we should each believe that 
that which is good for us is also good for the other.  And, given what has been said above, 
that these beliefs should be true.  
 And it seems from Aristotle’s presentation of a similar account of the features of 
friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics, not as his own developed theory, but rather, as the 
endoxa, or received opinions, from which he intends his own arguments to begin, that 
this sort of an understanding of what constitutes a good friendship was already, at least 
some extent, current in Greek culture at his time:  
 People take a friend to be someone who wishes for and does what is good, or appears good, for the 
 sake of the other, or someone who wishes the friend to exist and to live, for the friend’s own 
 sake; .... Others take a friend to be someone who spends time with the other and makes the same 
 choices, or who feels grief and pleasure with his friend.135
Moreover, something very like these broad outlines of the features to be expected of 
friendship, would seem to be operative at various junctures in Plato’s own dialogues.  In 
particular the claims that a friend will wish, and attempt to bring about, that which is 
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good, or which he believes to be good, for his friend,136 that a friend will share in the 
pleasure and grief of his friend,137 that a friend will wish the same things for his friend’s 
sake that he wishes for his own,138 and that a friend will himself be a good and a benefit 
to his friend139 all appear to be brought into play, in one form or another, by either 
Socrates or his interlocutors in the course of significant arguments.  Whether or not he 
endorses these claims about what constitutes a friendship, then, Plato seems very clearly, 
at least, to be aware of them.  And in many cases it seems plausible to think that he does 
endorse such claims.140  It seems significant, then, that the point at which the language 
Plato chooses to employ in describing the relationship between the lover and beloved 
 
69
136See, e.g., Polemarchus’ suggestion in Republic II.332a that “friends owe it to their friends to do good for 
them,” Socrates’ claim in Republic III.413c4-5 that the guardians’ “conviction that they must always do 
what they believe to be best for the city” is evidence of their philia for it, and Socrates’ inference in Lysis 
207d4-7 from the claim that Lysis’ parents feel a strong philia for him to the claim that they “would like” 
for him “to be as happy as possible.”  Though it might be argued that the latter two examples are not cases 
of the specific sort of philia which interests us in a discussion of friendship, it seems reasonable to think 
that if philia is this somewhat wider sense implies such a concern for the well-being of its object, then 
philia in our narrower sense, as a specific variety of this broader kind of affection, will share this feature.
137 This claim is implicit in Socrates’ contentions in Republic V.462d6-e1 & V.464d3-4 that “whenever 
anything good or bad happens to a single one of its citizens” the people of the Kallipolis, and the guardians/
auxiliaries in particular, “will share in the pleasure or pain,” and that they will all “as far as possible, feel 
pleasure and pain in unison,” if we accept Vlastos’ plausible reading of these features of the citizens’ 
relationships with one another as intended to follow from the strong ties of philia which their way of life 
and upbringing are designed to foster among them (see Vlastos, 11-13, though I contest many of his more 
substantial claims as to the significance and nature of this philia). 
138 See, e.g., Socrates’ claim in Republic III.412d4-5, that “Someone loves something most of all when he 
believes that the same things are advantageous to it as to himself,” where the kind of ‘love’ in question is 
philia. 
139 See, e.g., the exchange between Socrates and Polemarchus in Republic I.334b7-335a3, beginning with 
Socrates’ question “Speaking of friends, do you mean those a person believes to be good and useful to him, 
or those who actually are good and useful, even if he doesn’t think they are?”(Republic I.334b7-c2).
140 This is obviously a claim which requires more support, but this is not the place to argue it fully.  I 
believe, however, that a case can be made for Plato’s endorsement of several of the above claims on the 
basis of his arguments in Republic Books III-V, which I take to rely on these claims to support the 
proposedly unifying effects of the philia cultivated among the guardians/auxiliaries of the Kallipolis by 
their education and communal lifestyle.  It is my hope to make this case in detail in a future paper. 
shifts from primarily that of eros to primarily that of philia is also the point at which their 
relationship first acquires many of these features most closely associated with friendship.  
 And, one of the most crucial of these features, it seems, the acquisition of which 
marks one of the clearest breaks from any previous stage of their relationship, is 
reciprocity.  Such reciprocity is emphasized as a defining feature of friendship in both 
Aristotle’s brief discussion in the Rhetoric, above, and his more extended treatment of the 
different kinds of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics.  And, although Plato seems 
clearly to think that philia, as such, need not be reciprocal, since one might also have 
such ‘friendly feeling’ towards abstract or corporate entities such as wisdom or one’s 
polis, which need not be capable of returning it,141 it also seems quite plausible to think 
that he considers philia in the sense of ‘friendship’ to be a particular kind of philia in this 
broader sense, just as he has noted that the eros with which he is most centrally 
concerned in the palinode is that particular kind of eros which one feels towards other 
persons,142 rather than towards any other thing.  And just as this particular kind of eros 
has its own distinctive features, it seems reasonable to think that this particular kind of 
philia will as well.  Aristotle, of course, will make this argument explicitly: that although 
one can use the word philia to mean many different things, even speaking of the ‘love’ 
some people have for inanimate objects, such as wine,143 in this way, this is clearly not 
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141 At least, not presumably, although a case could be made that corporate entities such as a polis are 
capable of this.
142 Specifically, towards ‘beautiful boys,’ by his initial characterization at Phaedrus 249e4 (see above, p.10) 
though, as we have seen, this characterization evolves significantly over the course of the palinode.
143 See Nicomachean Ethics, 8.2 1155b27-32.  Note, also, that this particular example, of the ‘love of 
wine,’ is one which had been previously used by Plato in the Lysis.
the sort of love we mean when we use the word philia in the more specific sense of 
‘friendship.’  Rather, “friendship, people say, is good will between reciprocating 
parties,”144 as well as, he will go on to argue, a mutual recognition of this good will by 
both parties, and appropriate actions taken accordingly.  Furthermore, as Julia Annas has 
argued persuasively, it seems as though this same conclusion, that the sort of philia we 
mean when we use the word to pick out anything resembling ‘friendship’ will require 
reciprocity of feeling, is suggested by Plato’s own, ostensibly aporetic, arguments in the 
Lysis.145   
 The first aporia which Socrates claims to have generated on the topic of friendship 
in the Lysis centers on the question of who should be considered a friend, the person who 
loves or feels friendly feeling for someone, or the person for whom such love or friendly 
feeling is felt.  And this question is explicitly posed, at the outset, with respect to that love 
or friendly feeling which is felt towards other persons: “when someone loves someone 
else, which of the two becomes the friend of the other, the one who loves, or the one who 
is loved?”146  Socrates quickly leads Menexenus, Lysis’ closest friend, to agree that 
neither one who loves in this way without being so loved in return nor one who is so 
loved without also so loving can be rightly called a friend, since if either were the case, 
then one could easily become “a friend of a nonfriend, and even of an enemy”147 or “an 
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enemy to a nonenemy, or even to a friend.”148  And this, Socrates maintains, “doesn’t 
make any sense at all... it is simply impossible to be an enemy to one’s friend and a friend 
to one’s enemy,”149 as Menexenus readily agrees.  The clear implication of the intuition 
on which this conclusion rests, then, that one cannot be ‘a friend of a nonfriend,’ is that 
each party to a friendship must be a friend of the other, if there is to be any such thing as 
a friendship at all.  And when Socrates suggests the claim that friendship must be 
reciprocal as a possible answer to their worry about who will be a friend, proposing that 
“unless they both love each other, neither is a friend”150 so that “nothing is a friend of the 
lover unless it loves him in return,”151 Menexenus is initially inclined to agree.  He is lead 
to reject this claim only when Socrates introduces the question of whether one could then 
be truly said to be a ‘friend’ to the sorts of general or abstract things towards which one 
might be commonly said to feel philia, but which could not be reasonably said to feel it 
back:  
 So, there are no horse-lovers unless the horses love them back, and no quail-lovers, dog-lovers, 
 wine-lovers, or exercise-lovers.  And no lovers of wisdom, unless wisdom loves them in return.  
 But do people really love them even though these things are not their friends, making a liar of the 
 poet who said:    
   Happy the man who has as friends his children and
   solid-hoofed horses,
   his hunting hounds and a host abroad?152
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152 Lysis 212d8-e6. This part of the argument may seems especially strange to us, since it relies on a largely 
verbal point that the common Greek words for such things as ‘horse-lover,’ etc., were compounds involving 
philia: ‘horse-lovers’ above is ‘philippoi,’ for example, ‘wine-lovers ‘philoinoi,’ and ‘lovers of wisdom’ 
‘philosophoi,’ or ‘philosophers.’ 
Menexenus responds that he doesn’t think this poet was a liar, and so the suggestion is 
dismissed, and their arguments move on.  Notice, though, that this claim is only brought 
under suspicion at all by the introduction of worries beyond the scope of the original 
question, which was specifically about which of two people was a friend, when one of 
them loved the other.  And even once these worries have been raised, Socrates puts 
forward a suggestion as to how they might be plausibly resolved: that when people are 
lovers of horses, or of wine, or of wisdom, or of other such things, they do in fact love 
these things, and this love is philia, of a sort, but not of that sort which is friendship, and 
‘these things are not their friends.’  The only real argument offered against the claim that 
friendship is reciprocal, then, is that if it were correct, the cited piece of poetry would fail 
to be literally true, thus ‘making a liar of the poet.’  While Menexenus may find this a 
convincing argument, it seems highly unlikely that we are meant to, given what we know 
of Plato’s attitudes towards poetry.  Moreover, Socrates goes on to rely, without further 
comment, on the presumption that friendship is reciprocal, and seemingly symmetrically 
so, in his own later arguments, which take it as given that friends must “be prized by each 
other”153 “value each other”154 and “yearn for one another when apart.”155  As Annas has 
pointed out,156 these arguments clearly assume that to be a friend requires not only that 
one love, but also that one be loved, since, on the one hand, Socrates maintains that 
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“whoever doesn’t love is not a friend,”157 while, on the other, he asks Lysis,“how can 
anything be a friend if it is not prized?”158  Clearly “it can’t,”159 Lysis promptly replies, 
since, as Socrates argues, whatever someone “didn’t prize he wouldn’t love.”160  It seems 
that the case can be plausibly made, then, that Plato would accept reciprocity as one of 
the defining features of personal friendship.
 Again, then, it does not seem accidental that a shift in Plato’s language, from 
primarily that of eros, to primarily that of philia, occurs at just that point in his account in 
the Phaedrus where the relationship between the lover and beloved first acquires any sort 
of reciprocity: the point at which the beloved first begins to feel affection for the lover, 
and chooses to allow him a place in his life as a trusted social intimate.  That is, the point 
at which the beloved first ceases to be purely the object of the lover’s unilateral eros, and 
becomes, also, an active participant in what we have called the ‘pedagogical’ stage of 
their relationship.  Having come to see how genuinely the lover appears to desire to help 
and to benefit him, we should remember from our arguments above, the beloved 
eventually decides to let ‘the man spend time with him.’161  And he makes this decision, 
Plato argues, ‘because he is by nature disposed to be a friend (philos) of the man who is 
serving him.’162  He is so naturally ‘disposed,’ furthermore, towards those whom he 
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161 See above, p. 33; Phaedrus 255b1-2.
162 See above, p. 33; Phaedrus 255a3-4.
believes to genuinely mean him well, it seems, even when he is not well disposed 
towards the prospect of an erotic relationship: “even if he has already been set against 
love by schoolfriends or others who say that it is shameful to associate with a lover.”163  
And once he has allowed the lover to ‘talk and spend time with him,’164 he is even more 
deeply ‘amazed’165 by the extent of the genuine ‘good will’166 this person displays 
towards him in all of his behavior.  And so he comes to realize, it seems, that this lover is 
not only a lover, and certainly not a ‘lover’ in the sense with which his ‘schoolfriends’ 
have no doubt made him familiar, a person who desires and pursues him with promises of 
benefit in order to win his favors, but who has no further interest in his well-being than 
this, the sort of lover criticized so effectively in Socrates’ and Lysias’ earlier speeches.  
Instead, he is a lover who is also a friend.  And a friend, it seems, not independently of 
being a lover, but rather, as a consequence of being a lover, in that way which is most true 
to the divine nature of love: a ‘friend (philon) who is inspired by a god.’167  As he comes 
to know the lover and his true intentions well, then, he is shocked to discover ‘that all the 
friendship he has from his other friends and relatives put together is nothing compared 
to’168 the friendship of this lover who is also a friend.  And notice, here, exactly where all 
of this language of ‘friendship’ begins to be deployed: the beloved is initially ‘disposed’ 
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166 See above, p. 33; Phaedrus 255b5.
167 See above, p. 34; Phaedrus 255b7.
168 See above, pp. 33-34; Phaedrus 255b5-7.
to be a friend to the person who is ‘serving’ him, and so begins to take the time to come 
to know him better, and to better understand the motives he may have for doing all of 
these good things for him.  This disposition seems to become a reality, though, and the 
lover begins to be spoken of not only as his lover, but also as his friend, at the point at 
which the beloved comes to be fully aware of the extent of the ‘good will’ which the 
lover feels for him.  And ‘good will,’ here, is ‘eunoia,’ the same ‘good will’ which we 
saw above in Aristotle’s report that ‘friendship, people say, is good will between 
reciprocating parties.’169  Indeed, this ‘pedagogical’ stage of the relationship between the 
lover and beloved, as Plato describes it briefly here, seems to map fairly well onto one of 
the lesser sorts of friendship which Aristotle describes in his later account of the different 
kinds of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics.170  For our purposes, though, we need 
only note here that several of the key features of friendship as Aristotle has argued above 
that many would define it, and as Plato himself seems to acknowledge that it might be 
plausibly defined, now seem to be in place between the lover and beloved, most crucially, 
reciprocity of both ‘good will’ and benefit.
 The most significant break with all previous stages of their relationship, however, 
and the one on which Plato himself places the greatest emphasis, seems not to happen 
here, when the beloved enters into this ‘pedagogical’ relationship with the lover, but 
rather with the transition from this stage of their relationship to one of the two highest 
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8.13 1162a34-1162b14, c.f. 8.8 1159a34-1159b8.
sorts of relationship in which Plato argues that eros can possibly result.  The point at 
which the relationship between the lover and beloved is most drastically and significantly 
transformed seems clearly to be that at which the beloved in turn falls in love with the 
lover, and himself succeeds in correctly pursuing this love.  It is the two sorts of 
relationship which can come from this transformation in the beloved’s feelings for his 
lover, if he is able to correctly interpret and respond to them, which Plato argues will 
offer love’s greatest rewards, those which are ‘as great as divine gifts should be,’171 and 
which cannot be offered by any earlier stage of their relationship.  While what we have 
called the ‘pedagogical’ stage of their relationship may be pleasant, harmless, and even 
mildly spiritually or philosophically rewarding, if the full benefits of eros are to be 
gained, Plato argues, their relationship must progress beyond this stage.  This might 
initially lead us to dismiss the importance of the emphasis on friendship which we see 
beginning to emerge in Plato’s description of this earlier stage of the relationship.  To do 
so, however, would be a mistake.  This new emphasis on the element of friendship 
between the lover and beloved, which we see emerging here, with the shift in the 
beloved’s role from that of a purely passive object, to that of an actively consenting, if 
still primarily receptive, participant, continues to be a significant feature of Plato’s 
account of the two highest kinds of love, as the beloved’s role shifts even further, from 
that of a primarily receptive participant, to that of a fully equal and active partner in a life 
lived together with the lover.
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 And it is in Plato’s description of these two highest sorts of relationship in which 
eros can result that his shift to reliance on the language of philia become most telling.  
Though he relies again, as one would expect, primarily upon the language of eros in his 
description of the beloved’s own experience of eros and his struggle to interpret and 
respond to it correctly, just as he had in describing the original lover’s experience, once 
the beloved has emerged from this struggle largely victorious, as the original lover had, 
now able, as the original lover eventually was, to express his love with the appropriate 
‘reverence and awe,’ Plato’s emphasis on the language of philia returns.  In the few lines 
describing the highest possible sort of relationship to which eros can lead, that of the 
‘philosophical pair,’ who ‘follow the assigned regimen of philosophy’ and live a life of 
‘bliss and shared understanding’ on this earth, growing wings together after death, neither 
the language of philia nor that of eros is explicitly used.172  When Plato turns to 
describing the second best sort of relationship, however, that of those who waver from 
this highest possible course of eros by putting ‘ambition in place of philosophy,’173 he 
does so in terms of philia, while maintaining that this aspect of the description applies 
even more appropriately to the best sort of relationship than to this lesser one: ‘these two 
also live in mutual friendship (though weaker than that of the philosophical pair), both 
while they are in love and after they have passed beyond it.’174  Those engaged in the 
highest sort of relationship to which eros can lead, then, the ‘philosophical pair,’ now 
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173 See above, p. 47; Phaedrus 256c1.
174 See above, p. 47; Phaedrus 256c7-d1.
‘live in mutual friendship,’ just as this lesser pair does, but their friendship is stronger 
than that of this less ‘philosophical’ pair, and, presumably, just as, or even more, lasting.  
Most surprisingly, then, it seems to follow from this claim, in the case of the second-best 
sort of relationship at least, and most likely in that of the best sort as well, that this 
‘mutual friendship,’ though born of eros, no longer depends on eros for its continued 
strength and stability: though the friendship begins ‘while they are in love,’ it can 
continue, undiminished, even ‘after they have passed beyond it.’  
 Moreover, the benefits conferred by this final stage of the relationship in either its 
best or its second-best form, in both this life and the afterlife, seem not to be attendant 
upon the continuation of eros, which may or may not persist, between the members of 
each ‘pair,’ after this stage in their relationship has been achieved, but rather upon this 
lasting and ‘mutual friendship’ which their shared experience of eros has forged.  These 
two highest sorts of personal relationship, then, which Plato has argued will grant human 
beings the greatest possible benefits, are only indifferently erotic, after they have been 
attained.  The importance of eros to this process, it seems, is largely as the means of 
attaining them.  The benefits conferred by the highest sorts of life lived together, then, as 
such, are the benefits conferred by the highest sorts of friendship, not just the highest 
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sorts of love.175  And though such friendship may also be erotic, as time moves forward, 
it need not be.  Nothing of significance is lost should the passion which brought these 
pairs together burn out.  And, in the final passage of the palinode, where Socrates 
concludes his praise of love by returning briefly to the topic of the ‘non-lover’ of Lysias’ 
speech, to contrast the paucity of what such a person can offer with the rich possibilities 
of a rightly pursued love, he does so, quite pointedly, in the language of friendship.  
While the sexually motivated quid-pro-quo of a “non-lover’s companionship 
(oikeiotes)”176 he argues, can provide nothing more than “cheap, human dividends,”177 all 
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175 I have made a slide, over the course of this paragraph, from speaking of the two highest forms of 
relationship in which eros can result to speaking of the two highest forms of relationship, full stop, and 
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reasonable to think, given what has been argued, that Plato is attributing relative value to different sorts of 
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order for any sort of personal relationship to be a ‘higher’ one, in his estimation, than the two highest sorts 
of relationship described in the palinode, it would need to be so on the basis of some intrinsically more 
valuable or less disvaluable features it possessed, while still providing its participants with the same 
benefits as these two highest sorts of relationship resulting from eros.  The defining features of these two 
highest sorts of relationship which Plato describes, however, would seem to be the very features which 
allow them to provide these benefits to their participants.  While it is conceivable, then, that there might be 
other sorts of personal relationship or friendship which provided these same benefits to their participants on 
Plato’s view, it seems that these other sorts of relationship or friendship would need to resemble the two 
highest sorts of relationship described in the palinode in all of the defining features which we have 
discussed in order to do so.  It seems reasonable, then, to move forward under the assumption that the 
highest forms of friendship, on his view, if not identical to those described here in the palinode, will at the 
very least resemble them in all of the immediately relevant respects.
176 Phaedrus 256e4-5: τοῦ µὴ ἐρῶντος οἰκειότης. 
177 Phaedrus 256e6.
of the ‘divine gifts’ detailed in the palinode can be rightly hoped for from “a lover’s 
friendship (philia).”178
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VIII. Friendship in its Highest Forms
 It seems that this final account of the two highest sorts of relationship in which 
eros can result, then, is not only an account of the best sorts of erotic relationship, but 
also of the best sorts of personal friendship.  And given that it seems, from what we have 
said above, that the erotic and sexual elements of these two sorts of relationship have 
become largely indifferent, with their continuation or cessation having little effect upon 
the benefits offered to the participants in them by their continuing relations with each 
other, once this stage of their relationship has been reached, it seems that we should now 
ask what the features of these best kinds of relationship are, independently of the 
distinctively erotic characteristics which they may or may not continue to have.  And if 
we examine the features of these two sorts of relationship as friendships, keeping in place 
all of the features they have come to have through the historical process of their 
participants’ eros, but abstracting away from anything exclusively erotic in their ongoing 
relationships with each other, we will find ourselves facing a surprisingly familiar 
description of the best sorts of personal friendship.
 We will find, that is, that these two sorts of relationship, considered as friendships, 
share nearly all of the features most closely associated with the best sort of personal 
friendship described in Aristotle’s account in the Nicomachean Ethics.  Although the 
exact characteristics of this best sort of friendship, often referred to as ‘virtue friendship’ 
or ‘character friendship’ are widely debated, there are number of defining features, some 
shared with other kinds of friendship, and some unique to this one best kind, which are 
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generally taken to be central to Aristotle’s account.  First of all, as we have already 
discussed somewhat above, all kinds of friendship, on Aristotle’s view, and so this best 
kind as well, require some sort of “reciprocal loving of which both parties are aware,”179 
and a corresponding reciprocal good will or desire for the good of the other, on which 
each party is prepared to act wherever possible and appropriate.180  In every kind of 
friendship, then, and in this best kind as well, each party will provide, or at the very least 
desire and attempt to provide, some good or benefit to the other.  In the case of this best 
kind of friendship, moreover, as in the case of many of the other broadly better kinds of 
friendship, that which each party provides to the other, and so that which each of them 
receives from the relationship, will also be of the same kind of good or benefit, and to a 
roughly similar degree.  In these better kinds of friendship, then, and so in the best kind 
of friendship in particular, there will be both a qualitative and a quantitative equality in 
the benefits offered to each of the participants, so that “in all respects each party gets the 
same or similar things from the other, which is an attribute friendship should have.”181  
Furthermore in the best kind of friendship, as it seems is not the case in any of the other 
kinds of friendship on Aristotle’s account, each of the friends is also himself, in his own 
person, a good and a benefit to the other, “for the good person, in becoming a friend, 
becomes a good for the person to whom he becomes a friend,”182 “for the good are both 
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181Nicomachean Ethics, 8.4 1156b34-35.
182 Nicomachean Ethics, 8.5 1157b33-35.
good without qualification and of benefit to one another,”183 and Aristotle will argue at 
length that the parties to this best kind of friendship must always themselves be good.
 That such friends are a good to one another in this way is also a consequence of 
another unique feature of this best kind of friendship: that it, unlike any of the other kinds 
of friendship, is a mutual love based exclusively upon the features of the friends’ own 
characters, independently of any of their incidental traits, such as wealth, influence, or 
charm.  Such friendships based exclusively upon the friends’ own characters, Aristotle 
argues, must be built, at least in large part, on a mutual admiration and respect felt by 
each party for the other on account of his personal virtue or excellence: “being friends 
because of excellence, and because of what the parties are in themselves”184 each friend 
will love the other “by reference to the person he is.”185  In this way “the good will be 
friends because of themselves; for they will be friends in so far as they are good.”186  
Those who have truly bad characters, on the other hand, are unable to create or maintain 
such friendships on the basis of their characters alone, and “it is clear that the only ones 
who are friends because of themselves are the good; for the bad get no gratification from 
each other,”187 except incidentally.  Because such friends are friends ‘because of 
themselves,’ furthermore, and love one another because of their own most stable and 
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lasting qualities, the friendships they forge on this basis will also be stable and lasting 
ones.  While other sorts of friendship, and particularly, Aristotle argues, the traditional 
sorts of “erotic friendships”188 characterized by the exchange of very different sorts of 
goods between very different and unequal parties, will be unstable and quick to dissolve, 
unlikely to last over the course of a lifetime, “friendships based on character – being for 
their own sake – do last,”189 “for since their own attributes are lasting, so is their 
relationship to each other.”190  
 It is not, however, only virtue or excellence of character, assessed absolutely, on 
which such relationships are based, but rather, Aristotle argues, equality or similarity in 
such virtue or excellence.  It is always, he maintains, to some extent true that “‘equality 
and similarity make amity’, and most of all the similarity of those similar in 
excellence,”191 and so “it is the friendship between good people, those resembling each 
other in excellence”192 that will be the most “complete”193 and the best.  It is not only 
excellence of character, then, that brings such friends together, but also similarity of 
character: “for every kind of friendship is because of some good or because of 
pleasure, ...and in virtue of some sort of resemblance between the parties, and to this kind 
of friendship belong all the attributes mentioned, in virtue of what the friends are in 
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themselves, since in this respect they are similar.”194  And this similarity of character 
between friends of the best sort will be manifested in their sharing of the same values, 
aims, and pursuits, and of the same sorts of activity in which they take the greatest 
pleasure, and upon which they place the greatest emphasis in their lives, “for nothing is 
so characteristic of friends as living together... but it is not possible for people to spend 
their time with each other if they are not pleasant, and do not enjoy the same things.”195 
So, while “like-mindedness too is evidently a feature of friendship,”196 and can be found 
to various extents in other kinds of friendship as well, it is notable in particular that “this 
sort of like-mindedness is found among decent people, ...both with themselves and with 
each other, ... they have the same objectives... and they wish for what is just and what is 
advantageous, and also make these their common aim.”197  It will be most natural and 
easiest, then, for the good and the decent to ‘live together’ in the way that close friends 
desire, and, furthermore, most mutually beneficial for them to do so, since those activities 
which they value most highly and devote themselves to most consistently will be virtuous 
ones, which will in turn help to maintain and develop their virtue of character, “and 
whatever it is that for each sort of person constitutes existence, or whatever it is for the 
sake of which they choose to live, it’s this they wish to spend time doing in company with 
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197 Nicomachean Ethics, 9.6 1167b4-9. 
their friends... each kind spending their days together in doing whichever of the things in 
life most satisfies them.”198
 This best sort of friendship, then, will both require and foster a deep knowledge 
and understanding of each friend’s character by the other, if each is to love the other for 
the sake of his character, and to be right in doing so.  And so, “this type of friendship also 
requires that the parties have acquired experience of each other, and a close acquaintance 
with one another’s character, which is very difficult to achieve.”199  This knowledge of 
each other’s character will naturally grow over the course of their friendship with each 
other as well, as they spend their time “living together, conversing, and sharing their talk 
and thoughts; for this is what would seem to be meant by ‘living together’ where human 
beings are concerned.”200  This knowledge of each other’s character, in turn, will foster 
not only love, but also trust, between them, since they will know one another to be both 
good and trustworthy, with the confidence one rightly has in one’s judgements “about a 
person one has scrutinized oneself over a long period.”201  It will also allow each of them 
to offer greater help, comfort, and pleasure to the other than they would have been able to 
do without the aid of this knowledge, since in all of their conversations with and actions 
towards each other they “will know the character of the person affected, and the things 
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that give him pleasure and pain,”202 and choose the most appropriate course accordingly.  
Moreover, through their interactions they will not only come to know each other’s 
characters well, but will also gain insight into their own characters, and develop both 
their own and their friend’s virtue further through emulation of one another’s better 
qualities and correction of one another’s failings, as well as through shared endeavor 
towards virtuous activity: “for the good man, in so far as he is good, delights in actions in 
accordance with excellence, and is disgusted by those flowing from badness,”203 so that 
good men who are friends “become better by being active and correcting each other, for 
they take each other’s imprint in those respects in which they please one another.”204
 If we have made our case well, then each of these defining features of Aristotle’s 
much-discussed ‘character friendship’ should by this time find an obvious parallel among 
those which have emerged from our analysis of the evolving relationships between 
Plato’s two most successful ‘pairs’ of lovers or friends in the Phaedrus.  Furthermore, on 
at least one plausible reading of Aristotle’s claim that a friend of this best sort “is to his 
friend as he is to himself (for his friend is another self),”205 such that “friendship in its 
superior form resembles one’s love for oneself,”206 this will also be true of the parties to 
these two highest kinds of relationship in the palinode.  Insofar as they are of the same 
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character, share the same aspirations, know one another’s souls as they know their own, 
desire the same goods for one another that they desire for themselves, take pleasure in 
one another’s goods and successes in the way that they take pleasure in their own, and 
consider one another’s goods integral to their own well-being in much the same way as 
those goods which accrue to them more directly, each of the members of Plato’s two 
‘pairs’ of friends or lovers will love and relate to the other in much the same way that he 
does himself.207   
 There is a crucial element of Aristotle’s account of the best kind of friendship, 
however, which is conspicuously absent from these two best kinds of friendship as 
described by Plato.  As we saw above, in Aristotle’s initial definition of friendship in the 
Rhetoric, he makes a point of claiming that when you are truly a friend to someone, you 
desire that which you believe to be good for that person ‘not for your own sake but for 
his,’ and this apparent contrast, between that which one desires for one’s own sake, and 
that which one desires for the sake of one’s friend, is generally taken to be a central 
element of his account of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics as well.208  We have 
already seen this aspect of his account in the Nicomachean Ethics appear above in his 
recounting of what ‘people take a friend to be’: someone who wishes the good, or 
apparent good, of his friend ‘for the sake of the other,’ or ‘for the friend’s own sake.’  
This provision appears elsewhere in the account as well, and often in the context of the 
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ways in which the best kind of friends’ love for one another is like the love which they 
have for themselves, for example, in the claim that “the one who is most a friend is the 
friend who wishes good things for the one for whom he wishes them, for the other’s sake, 
even if no one will know; and these features belong most to oneself in relation to 
oneself....”209  Though we have seen, then, that Aristotle sometimes uses similar wording 
in the Nicomachean Ethics to mean something very different from what it would appear 
to mean in the Rhetoric passage, as when he claims above, for example, that the love 
which one feels for one’s friends is ‘for their own sake’ when it is ‘based on character,’ 
insofar as one then loves them ‘because of themselves,’ and so ‘for the sake of’ the 
persons who they most essentially are, it seems clear that he also deploys this sort of 
wording in a sense very much like that with which he used it in the Rhetoric. 
 In the Nicomachean Ethics, then, there seem to be (at least) two importantly 
different senses of ‘for their own sake’ at work in Aristotle’s account.210  On the one 
hand, there is a sense of ‘for their own sake’ in play with which the natural contrast 
would be something like ‘for the sake of their political connections,’ or ‘for the sake of 
their dinner parties,’ or even, it seems, ‘for the sake of their pleasant sense of humor.’  
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210 For helpful discussion of the different ways in which Aristotle employs this expression (and the several 
Greek expressions it commonly translates) in his accounts of friendship see Michael Pakaluk. Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction. (New York: Cambridge U.P., 2005) 263-271; Kelly Rogers. 
“Aristotle on Loving Another for His Own Sake.” Phronesis, 39.3 (1994): 291-302, especially 291-293; 
Whiting, 283-287; & Jennifer Whiting. “Eudaimonia, External Results, and Choosing Virtuous Actions for 
Themselves.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65.2 (Sep. 2002): 274-276.  See also Jennifer 
Whiting. “Impersonal Friends.” The Monist, 74.1 (Jan. 1991): 3-29, where I take one significant thread in 
her argument to be that these seemingly different uses of the expression are in fact much more closely 
related than they initially appear.
Here, it seems that ‘for the sake of’ is being used to pick out those things about the 
friends in question on account of which one feels affection for them or chooses to be their 
friend, those things about them by which one is motivated to pursue or maintain a 
friendship with them.  And in this sense of ‘for their own sake’ it seems that the two best 
sorts of friendship which we see in the Phaedrus are as much ‘for the friend’s own sake’ 
as Aristotle’s own best kind of friendship, insofar as these two best sorts of friendship are 
equally based on the most essential aspects of each party’s own character.  But there is 
also a sense of ‘for the friend’s own sake’ in play in the Ethics which, as in the Rhetoric, 
invites a contrast, instead, with that which is ‘for your own sake,’ or perhaps even ‘for the 
sake of’ other people or entities in which one takes an interest, such as one’s family or 
polis.211  This sense of ‘for the sake of’ would seem to be indicating something more like 
the person (or entity) on whose behalf, or for whose benefit, one takes oneself to act, or to 
feel, as one does.  And it is this sense of the claim that one’s goodwill or love for one’s 
friend, in the best kind of friendship, must be ‘for the friend’s own sake,’ with its implied 
contrast, which brings into play the much fraught debate over the respective roles of 
‘egoism’ and ‘altruism’ in Aristotle’s theory of friendship, and in the ethics of friendship 
in general, and the related (and sometimes conflated) debate over whether the best sort of 
friend, either in Aristotle’s theory or in matter of ethical fact, may value his friend’s good, 
or even his friend, instrumentally, or only as a final good.  Though this is a debate too 
sweeping to engage with in any detail here, it is worth noting, I think, that Plato does not 
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feel the need to explicitly draw such a contrast in the Phaedrus, despite drawing a very 
clear distinction between those who genuinely do desire the good of those for whom they 
feel eros, and those who are merely willing to promote that good insofar as it is an 
effective means to achieving their other desires, without taking any further interest in it.  
And, while this is a point which would likely require its own paper to argue convincingly, 
I would like to at least suggest here that this difference between Plato’s approach and 
Aristotle’s is not an insignificant one.  Nor, I think, does it reflect a simple failure on 
Plato’s part to consider a problem of which Aristotle was more fully aware.  
 I would like to suggest, rather, that Plato’s lack of attention to this question in the 
Phaedrus is tied to his commitment elsewhere to the claim that final and instrumental 
value are by no means incompatible, and, furthermore, that a given individual may 
simultaneously value a given thing both instrumentally and as an end, without his 
ascription to it of one kind of value in any way diminishing his ascription to it of the 
other.  In fact, as one may recall from the well-known passages in Book II of his 
Republic, Plato has seemed to endorse the view that “the finest goods,”212 those which we 
both do and should value most highly, are of the “kind of good we like for its own sake 
and also for the sake of what comes from it – knowing, for example, and seeing.... We 
welcome such things, I suppose, on both counts.”213  He will go on, in the Republic, to 
argue that justice, and all the other virtues, are of this kind of good: such that we naturally 
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value them both for their own sake and for the sake of their consequences, that is, both as 
final an as instrumental goods.  And to value things in this way, it seems, is on his view to 
value them more highly, not less so, than those things to which we ascribe exclusively 
final value, such as “joy... and all the harmless pleasures that have no results beyond the 
joy of having them.”214  If we take this claim seriously, then, it seems that much of the 
debate over how one should value the friend and his good, and, consequently, the related 
debate over the roles of egoism and altruism in such relationships, will need to be re-
framed in a Platonic context.  And, by taking this claim seriously, we can begin to see a 
principled motivation for the seemingly curious lack of priority in the various goods of 
the world of the soul depicted in the palinode, where, as we have seen, each of the central 
goods in the soul’s unembodied existence would seem to be treated simultaneously as an 
independently desirable end and as a means to the achievement and maintenance of the 
others, as well as for the corresponding lack of clear priority in Plato’s depiction of the 
lover’s motivations for pursuing a relationship with his beloved.  
 We may also, I think, begin to see a response to yet another of the supposed 
aporiai about friendship generated by Socrates in the Lysis.  How can it be, he there asks 
Menexenus, that anyone or anything can be truly called a ‘friend,’ except for “some first 
principle,”215 “for the sake of which we say that all the rest are friends too.”216  If 
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“whoever is a friend.... has to be a friend to someone.... for the sake of something,”217 he 
argues, and this ‘something’ will itself be a ‘friend’ as well, then “the friend is friend of 
its friend for the sake of a friend,”218 and this regress can hardly go on forever.  So, 
eventually, some “first friend”219 must be reached, “which will no longer bring us back to 
another friend.”220  But wouldn’t it then be the case, he suggests, that “all the other things 
that we have called friends for the sake of that thing may be deceiving us, like so many 
phantoms of it, and that it is the first thing which is truly a friend?”221  If this picture has 
things right, he argues, then “the real friend is surely that in which all these so-called 
friendships terminate,”222 in which case “the real friend is not a friend for the sake of a 
friend.”223  Rather, it seems, it will turn out that only the good itself is a ‘real friend,’ 
since only the good is not “prized and loved”224 for the sake of any other thing.  To reach 
this conclusion, however, Socrates has implicitly generated a dichotomy between that 
which is ‘prized and loved’ as a final good, and that which is ‘prized and loved’ as an 
instrumental good or ‘for the sake of’ some other thing, such that Menexenus is led to 
infer that these two ways of loving or valuing any given thing are mutually exclusive and 
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exhaustive.225  If we take the above claim from Republic Book II, seriously, however, 
then this is a dichotomy that Plato rejects.  And without this dichotomy, the supposed 
aporia which Socrates goes on to generate from the conclusion that only the good is a 
friend will fail to follow.  We have several good reasons, then, it seems, to give this claim 
further attention in the context of Plato’s views on interpersonal friendship and love.
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things which we ‘love’ for the sake of something else, but only that thing for the sake of which we love 
them, is of items clearly valued exclusively as means or instrumental goods: the wine which a man believes 
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Socrates leads Menexenus to generalize from this intuition to the claim that nothing is truly loved if it is 
loved for the sake of something else, presumably by way of an implicit conflation of the claim that that 
which is loved for the sake of something else is not truly loved with the claim that that which is loved only 
for the sake of something else is not truly loved.  But this latter move can only be valid on the assumption 
that all things which are loved for the sake of something else are loved only for the sake of something else, 
an assumption which we have seen that we have reason to think Plato rejects.  Furthermore, Socrates’ use 
of a man’s love for his son as the example of ‘true’ love in this case serves to highlight the problem with 
this assumption in the context of the Lysis as a whole, since his initial conversation with Lysis had seemed 
to suggest that fathers (and mothers), in particular, should be taken to love their sons for the sake of other 
things.
IX. The Philosophical Friends
 Leaving aside, for the moment, though, discussion of the ways in which Plato’s 
two highest sorts of friend in the Phaedrus may or may not be said to love each other ‘for 
the sake of the other,’ or to wish one another’s good ‘for the friend’s own sake,’ it seems 
that a different contrast with Aristotle’s later account may offer us a useful insight into the 
nature of these two highest relationships described by Plato.  Although both of these two 
highest sorts of relationship on Plato’s account share nearly all of the most important 
features of Aristotle’s ‘character friendship,’ and, it seems, to an equivalent extent, on 
Aristotle’s account the possession of these features is treated as sufficient to identify a 
friendship as one of the highest possible sort, while on Plato’s account one of these two 
kinds of friendships is seen as significantly superior to the other, not only in quality, but 
in kind.  And this is because, Plato has argued, although both of these friendships share 
all of the features we have noted in common with Aristotle’s ‘character friendship,’ as 
well as the others which we have briefly discussed above, in the highest kind of 
friendship the pair of friends ‘follow the assigned regimen of philosophy’ in their life 
lived together, whereas in the second-best kind they instead have ‘ambition in place of 
philosophy,’ as in some sense filling the same central role.  And this single difference, it 
seems, is conceived of as deeply affecting the overall natures of these two kinds of 
friendship, despite all the rest they have in common.  Plato’s explanation of this crucial 
difference, however, is frustratingly brief.  What are we to take it to mean, for the nature 
of these two kinds of friendship, that the parties engaged in them ‘follow ... philosophy,’ 
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or put ambition in its place?  What exactly is the ‘place’ of philosophy in the life of the 
‘philosophical pair,’ which is somehow usurped by ‘ambition’ in the lesser pair’s case?  
While there does also seem to be a difference in the centrality of the specifically sexual 
aspects of these two pairs’ relationships, Plato casts this difference as a consequence of 
the difference between the roles that philosophy and ambition play in their respective 
lives together, and the resultant differences in their personal characters, rather than in any 
way a cause of the important differences between their two relationships or ways of life.  
If we are to find an explanation for the superiority of one of these kinds of friendship to 
the other, then, it seems that we must look for it in the respective roles philosophy and 
ambition play in the shared lives of the friends.
 As a first attempt we might take the claim that the ‘philosophical pair’ ‘follow the 
assigned regimen of philosophy’ to mean that they live their shared life together in that 
way which is ‘assigned’ by philosophy, that is, in that way in which philosophy dictates 
or directs that they should do.  To say this much, however, does little to reduce the 
ambiguity implicit in the claim, since there are still at least two fairly obvious 
interpretations we might give of what this means.  On the one hand, we might take it to 
mean that they live their life together in accordance with a ‘regimen’ the specifications of 
which are contained in or implied by philosophy, where ‘philosophy’ is conceived of as a 
body of knowledge from which practical rules or recommendations for conduct can be 
drawn or inferred.  On this reading Plato would be claiming that the ‘philosophical pair’ 
live their lives in accordance with a ‘regimen’ dictated by philosophy in much the same 
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way in which we might ordinarily say that someone lives his life in accordance with a 
‘regimen’ dictated by medicine, that is, according to that way of life which medicine, 
understood as a body of knowledge both containing and implying certain practical rules 
or recommendations, tells him, or allows him to see for himself, is the best or most 
appropriate way for him to live.  One might think, then, on this reading of the claim, that 
for the ‘philosophical pair’ to live in accordance with the ‘regimen of philosophy,’ is 
simply for them to live their life in that way which is prescribed for them as best by the 
new knowledge of themselves and their place in the cosmos which they have gained 
through their revelatory recollections and experience of eros.  If this is the way we should 
read the claim, however, then it seems that the majority of the important progress which 
the ‘philosophical pair’ will make during their time spent together has already been made 
by the that time they have reached this final stage of their relationship, during the initial, 
turbulent, course of their eros.  It is through this process, after all, of their initial erotic 
‘possession’ and struggle to make sense of and respond to it correctly, that they have 
come to have their transformational insights into the natures of their own souls, the souls 
of the gods, and the world of the perfectly real beings, as well as to forge the psychic 
concord in themselves which will allow them to reliably implement the lessons of these 
insights in the course of their future lives.  Viewed in this way, the continuing relationship 
between the ‘philosophical pair’ after this final stage of their relationship has been 
reached looks relatively unimportant, more like an extended period of resting on their 
laurels won in love than like a highly laudable or fruitful form of interaction in its own 
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right.  The philosophical and ethical significance of their lifelong friendship, then, would 
seem to be secondary, on this reading, to that of the briefer period of intense eros through 
which it was formed.  Even if we leave aside, however, the more general question of 
whether it would be appropriate to think of ‘philosophy,’ in the context of the Phaedrus, 
in this way, as referring to a given body of knowledge which one might come to have 
through various philosophical activities, reading the claim in this way would leave us 
with a much more obvious problem: if the ‘place’ of ‘philosophy’ in the life of this 
highest pair of friends is that of a newly-learned body of knowledge from which they can 
infer practical guidance as to how to live their lives, then in what plausible sense could 
‘ambition’ come to occupy this ‘place’?  ‘Ambition’ would hardly seem to be the sort of 
thing which could be thought of as constituting a body of knowledge, analogous to 
medicine or other such arts, from which one might draw or infer practical guidance.  If 
we are to preserve the parallel which Plato draws, then, between the ‘place’ of philosophy 
in the life of the ‘philosophical pair’ and that of ‘ambition’ in the life of the lesser pair of 
friends, then it seems we must read this claim in a different way.   
 Fortunately, the second most obvious way in which we might read this claim 
seems more promising in this respect.  And this second reading would also seem to be 
suggested by the language of the passage itself.  The word translated as ‘ambition’ in the 
passage above is ‘philotimia,’ which could also be translated as ‘love of honor,’ just as 
‘philosophy’ could be translated as ‘love of wisdom.’  The parallel roles which 
‘philosophy’ and ‘ambition’ play in the lives of the greater and lesser pair of friends, then, 
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are each being played by a certain kind of love, and, moreover, by a certain kind of 
philia.  Where ‘ambition’ has taken the place of ‘philosophy’ in the lives of the lesser pair 
of friends, then, what has happened would seem to be much more clear: the role most 
appropriately played in the life of the friends by the love of wisdom has come to be 
played by the love of honor instead, and so the same ‘place’ which the love of wisdom 
fills in the life of the best kind of friends has come to be occupied by the love of honor in 
the lesser pair’s case.  On this sort of reading, it seems, ‘philosophy’ is not meant to refer 
to a body of knowledge and its associated applications, but rather to something much 
more like a system of values or motivations, in much the same way that ‘ambition’ 
typically does.  And this reading would be very much in holding with the sorts of claims 
we are accustomed to hearing from Plato’s Socrates, that to be a philosopher is to value, 
love, and pursue wisdom, rather than to have it entirely. 226  The way in which 
‘philosophy’ directs the best pair of friends towards its ‘assigned regimen’ in their life 
together, then, would be less analogous to the way in which we might ordinarily say that 
something like medicine does this than the way in which we might ordinarily say that 
something like health-consciousness does.  Just as the love of health and desire to be 
healthy would lead the individuals who had it to live their lives in certain ways, according 
to that ‘regimen’ which they took to best advance them in the pursuit of their goal of good 
health, both for themselves and, potentially, for others, the love of wisdom, or of honor, 
would likewise lead the individuals who had them to live their lives in those ways, or 
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according to those ‘regimens,’ which they took to best advance them in their pursuits of 
wisdom and of honor, respectively.  The ‘place’ of philosophy in the lives of the best kind 
of friends, then, would be that of a shared value, aim, or guiding principle, according to 
the pursuit and glorification of which they ordered and organized their shared life 
together.  The crucial difference between the best and the second-best kinds of friendship, 
then, would be a difference in the highest shared value, the shared passion, pursuit, or 
project, according to which these two respective kinds of friends organized their common 
life.  Where the shared life of the ‘philosophical pair’ would be one devoted to a common 
passion for and collaborative pursuit of wisdom, the shared life of the lesser pair would 
be one devoted to a common passion for and collaborative pursuit of honor instead.227  
 And on this reading it does not seem to be the case that the most important work 
of the friends’ lives together has already been done by the time that they reach this 
highest stage of their relationship.  Rather, the benefits offered by the course of their eros 
have provided them with the foundations on which to build, in the best of such 
friendships, an ongoing, collaborative, pursuit of wisdom, throughout the rest of their 
lives and beyond.  Their revelatory recollections of the worlds of the souls and the 
perfectly real beings have provided them with a desire for wisdom which they had 
formerly lacked (or at least failed to consciously recognize) by offering them a new 
awareness of the existence of a world of pure truth beyond the margins of their ordinary 
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further in a future paper.
experience, as well as of their own capacity to know this world through the direct 
perceptions of their unembodied souls and their resulting ability to recollect its truths 
during their current, embodied, lives, while simultaneously opening their eyes to the 
otherworldly joys of their unembodied souls and so to their own deep and inborn desires 
to draw as close as they possibly can to the truths and perfections of these transcendent 
worlds.  The psychic concord which they have created and learned to maintain through 
their successful struggles with the initial violence of their eros, moreover, has provided 
them with the stability of character and rule of reason in their souls which they will need 
if they are to reliably follow the courses of action and overall way of life towards which 
the rational parts of their souls direct them as those most conducive to their pursuit of 
wisdom, as well as most in holding with the demands of wisdom itself, insofar as they 
may come to have it, and with the honor and respect which they owe to wisdom, in all of 
its manifestations, as something they both value highly and know to be ‘divine.’  In 
addition to this newfound understanding of and desire for wisdom, furthermore, and the 
necessary stability and responsiveness of soul required in order to pursue this newfound 
desire, their experiences of eros have also provided them with two further resources on 
which to rely in their ongoing pursuit of wisdom: the first of these, in holding with what 
has been gradually emerging as a unifying theme in the Phaedrus, is the insight they have 
been granted into the natures of their own individual souls, both as souls of a given type, 
and as particularly positioned instances of that type, and the second, it now seems 
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plausible to claim, is the partner and aid in the project of philosophy which they have 
gained in the person of their lover turned friend.
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X. Friendship and the Nature of Philosophy
 But here we come up against what would appear to be a confusion in our 
argument.  Haven’t we argued above that the ‘philosophical’ type of soul is one among 
the immutable ‘divine’ types into which souls are to be divided according to the god ‘in 
whose chorus they danced’ in heaven?  Are not the ‘philosophers’ among us, that is, to be 
identified not with the most accomplished of the souls belonging to each of these 
‘divine’ types of soul, as it seems that our ‘philosophical pair’ are, but rather with the 
most accomplished among those souls who are naturally followers of Zeus?  Fortunately 
for our argument, it seems that the answer to this question is both more complex, and 
much more interesting, than we might initially be led to expect.  It would seem, in fact, 
that Plato’s account in the Phaedrus provides us with two different senses in which 
human beings might be rightly called philosophers: first if they are true lovers and 
pursuers of wisdom, as the members of our ‘philosophical pair’ now are, and, second, if 
they are both this and practitioners of the art of dialectic, which constitutes the most 
systematic and universal means of effecting such pursuit.  It is in the second sense, I 
would like to claim, that only the most accomplished followers of Zeus are properly to be 
called philosophers, while in the first sense a sufficiently accomplished soul of any of the 
many ‘divine’ types may also deserve this name.
 Recall, above, in our discussion of the ways in which the beloved might initially 
come to see ‘himself in the lover as in a mirror,’ the parallel we drew between the activity 
of the lover during the early, ‘pedagogical,’ stage of their relationship, and the activity of 
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which Plato has argued, in the second half of the Phaedrus, that true rhetoric, insofar as 
there is such a thing, must be the art: that of ‘directing the soul by means of speech.’  We 
had begun, in that discussion, to see a unifying theme emerging between the discussion of 
love in the first part of the Phaedrus and the discussion of rhetoric in its second part: an 
emphasis on the crucial importance to both of these endeavors of the knowledge of souls.  
While both the successful progress of their love and the advancement of their own 
personal virtue depends, for the lovers, in large part on the developing insight into the 
natures of their own and one another’s souls which they have gained through their 
experience of love, the art of the true rhetorician, by Plato’s later arguments, can only be 
the art of understanding the natures of all human souls – their various types and the ways 
in which these types will manifest themselves in the behavior of individuals here in this 
world – and so the ways in which various individuals will respond, in various contexts, to 
various kinds of attempts at persuasion.  The true rhetorician, that is, must, on this view, 
be an expert psychologist, able to deeply understand, and so to effectively ‘direct,’ or 
manipulate, the soul of any individual whom he encounters.  The successful lover, on the 
other hand, must possess only a very specific portion of the knowledge and skill which 
the true rhetorician must have: he must understand the natures and particular 
manifestations not of all types of souls and their many variations, but only of that one 
type of soul which he and his beloved share, and the ways in which it manifests in their 
two particular cases.  It seems, however, as though this parallel between the art of the true 
rhetorician and the activity of our successful lovers has been gradually effaced as they 
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have moved beyond this ‘pedagogical’ stage of their relationship and into the equal 
partnership in life which they now share.  The parallel between the activity of the true 
lover and the art of the true rhetorician, that is, would seem to depend in large part upon 
the asymmetry between the lover and beloved which has now disappeared.  The true 
lover, during the pedagogical stage of their relationship, ‘directed’ the soul of his beloved 
towards greater understanding and virtue on the basis of the knowledge which he himself 
had newly gained through his experience of love, but which the beloved did not yet share. 
Once the beloved has himself become a lover, however, and achieved a position of parity 
with the original lover in respect to such knowledge, it seems that the time for unilateral 
‘directing’ is over.  Once the pair have reached this stage of their relationship, however, it 
seems that we can start to see an even more important parallel beginning to emerge: that 
between the activity in which the ‘philosophical pair’ are now engaged together, and the 
activity of which dialectic is the art.
 True rhetoric, Plato has Socrates argue in the second half of the Phaedrus, the art 
of ‘directing the soul by means of speech,’ is an art that can only be fully mastered as a 
“side effect”228 of studying the much broader art of “dialectic.”229  Dialectic, in turn, he 
defines as the art of making proper “divisions and collections”230 of any given subject 
into the appropriate natural kinds, and ranging the various elements of that subject 
correctly under their true definitions and the true definitions of the kinds to which they 
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belong, so as to come to understand not only the true natures of the things being studied, 
but also of their relationships to one another.231  This art, he argues, is required not only 
for coming to systematically and comprehensively understand the various types of souls 
and of speech, as the true rhetorician must, but for coming to systematically and 
comprehensively understand any subject at all.  As an art of understanding, then, and not 
just of speech, dialectic, when practiced in speech, need not simply serve to impart to 
another information which the practitioner of the art already has.  Rather, where rhetoric 
alone, at its very best, can serve only to convey knowledge (or perhaps even only true 
belief) from the rhetorician to the listener, dialectic can be used to create new knowledge, 
not only in an interlocutor, but in the dialectician himself.  It is an art not only of 
speaking, Plato argues, but of thinking as well, and those who pursue it do so in order that 
they “may be able to think and to speak.”232
 Where dialectic is employed in the composition of speeches, then, Plato implies 
that it need not serve only to present a position upon which the composer of the speech 
has already decided.  Rather, the reasoning employed in producing such a speech may 
itself be a means by which the truth of the matter is “discovered,” or by which the 
dialectician and his audience together are “led” closer to discerning that truth.233  The 
distinctive practice of this art, he argues, is first and foremost that of “seeing together 
things that are scattered about everywhere and collecting them into one kind, so that by 
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defining each thing we can make clear the subject,”234 while at the same time being 
careful “to cut up each kind according to its species along its natural joints, and... not to 
splinter any part, as a bad butcher might do.”235  Recall here, however, the claim which 
we saw Plato make at the very beginning of the palinode to love, that every human being 
‘must understand speech in terms of general forms, proceeding to bring many perceptions 
together into a reasoned unity,’236 and that this “process is the recollection of the things 
our soul saw when it was traveling with god.”237  In light of this claim, the process of 
‘collection and division’ which Plato describes for us here as the distinctive task of 
dialectic – bringing many scattered things together under the unifying definition of a 
single general kind, while carefully dividing up all such general kinds along their ‘natural 
joints’ until we “reach something indivisible”238 – looks very much like a systematic way 
of engaging in just such a process of recollection.  The art of dialectic, then, would be the 
art of systematically employing the resources provided to us by our natural ability to 
understand the ‘general forms’ required for the use of language in order to provoke 
further or more precise recollections of the corresponding general truths which our souls 
came to know in their travels with god.  And if this is the essence of the art of dialectic, 
provoking recollection in the soul in this way through the systematic use of language, 
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then it is in principle equally well suited to doing so either in the soul of the dialectician 
himself or in the souls of others.
 Where the dialectician has applied his dialectic to achieve a systematic 
understanding of souls, then, that is, where he has become a true rhetorician as well, he 
will be able to employ his dialectic to provoke recollection not only in the souls of other 
people who are much like himself, and so likely to be moved towards recollection by the 
same sorts of uses of language which are likely to move him, but also in the souls of 
anyone with whom he is able to engage in speech.  And from this, perhaps, we can begin 
to see at least one motivation for Socrates’ rather puzzling condemnation of writing in the 
midst of Plato’s own written work.  Such a dialectician, as it seems we must take Socrates 
himself to be, will have a keen awareness of the inevitable limitations of even the best 
sort of writing: a written work, once committed to paper, is incapable of adapting itself to 
the souls of its individual readers, “it continues to signify just that very same thing 
forever.... reaching indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who 
have no business with it, and it doesn’t know to whom it should speak and to whom it 
should not.”239  A living dialectician, on the other hand, in his role as a true rhetorician, 
can “determine which kind of speech is appropriate to each kind of soul... and offer a 
complex and elaborate speech to a complex soul and a simple speech to a simple one.... 
either in order to teach or in order to persuade.”240  And when a dialectician pursues his 
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art for the right reasons, and practices it with the right goals in mind, in accordance with 
the right set of values, “so as to be able to speak and act in a way that pleases the gods as 
much as possible,”241 realizing that “only what is said for the sake of understanding and 
learning, what is truly written in the soul concerning what is just, noble, and good can be 
clear, perfect, and worth serious attention,”242 then he is rightly to be called “wisdom’s 
lover – a philosopher.”243 
 Plato implies very heavily, however, that this sort of philosophy, the practice of 
dialectic as a systematic art towards the end of pursuing wisdom for oneself and fostering 
its growth in others, is the province of the followers of Zeus.  So, Socrates tells Phaedrus, 
in the course of the palinode, that “we were with Zeus, while others followed other 
gods,”244 and concludes his description of the philosopher-dialectician with the claim that 
“such a man, Phaedrus, would be just what you and I both would pray to become.”245  
And where he finds someone with a talent for dialectic, Socrates claims, he will “follow 
‘straight behind, in his tracks, as if he were a god.’”246  But this, of course, is just the 
behavior which he has described in a lover who has seen his god’s image in the soul of a 
prospective beloved.  And where Socrates has seen an image of his god, he has seen an 
image of Zeus.  When those who follow Zeus, then, ‘choose someone to love who is a 
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244 Phaedrus 250b6-7.
245 Phaedrus 278b2-3.
246 Phaedrus 266b6-7.
Zeus himself’ insofar as he ‘has a talent for philosophy and the guidance of others,’247 it 
seems very plausible that the talent in question is an aptitude specifically for 
‘philosophy’ as dialectic, and the corresponding gift for the ‘guidance of others’ which 
comes from its application to teaching other souls through the art of true rhetoric.
 The philosophy, then, in which our ‘philosophical pair’ are engaged, at least in 
those cases where they are not themselves followers of Zeus, will not be the sort of 
philosophy as dialectic to which the Zeus-type souls are particularly suited, but rather, 
some other way of honoring and pursuing wisdom in their lives.  And this dual usage of 
‘philosophy,’ sometimes picking out a specific way of honoring and pursuing wisdom 
through the art of dialectic, and sometimes the much broader practice of honoring and 
pursuing wisdom in whatever way is suited to the nature of one’s own particularly 
situated type of soul, can account for what might otherwise seem to be oddly conflicting 
claims within the palinode about what is required for a soul to regrow its wings.  Having 
claimed, for example, that this prize is to be won both by loving philosophically and by 
practicing ‘philosophy without guile,’ Plato goes on, within less than a page, to claim that 
“only a philosopher’s mind grows wings.”248  If this is not to be a contradiction, then, we 
must take it that practicing ‘philosophy without guile,’ that is, as we might now presume, 
employing the arts of dialectic and true rhetoric in the pursuit and teaching of truth, and 
loving philosophically are both ways of being a philosopher, since the souls of those who 
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do both of these things will regrow their wings.  And here, it seems, Plato’s choice of 
Zeus as the god of the philosopher-dialecticians may be helpful to us in understanding the 
relationship between these two kinds of philosophy.  The role of Zeus, in the palinode’s 
description of the divine procession, is a universal, systematic task; he is charged with 
“looking after everything, and putting all things in order,”249 while each of the other gods 
is occupied only with “seeing to his own work.”250  The dialectician then, in attempting to 
understand the world comprehensively and systematically, is emulating the distinctive 
way of life of his god, ‘looking after everything, and putting all things in order’ in his 
own mind, following the unchanging patterns provided by the perfectly real beings 
outside of heaven in order to do this correctly, just as Zeus himself does in the cosmos as 
a whole.251  If this comprehensive systemization is the element of dialectic that belongs to 
the emulation of Zeus, then, what do we have left to say about the method by which the 
other types of souls pursue philosophy? 
 If what we have suggested above about the connection between dialectic and 
recollection is true, then it seems that dialectic is a systematic art of promoting 
recollection through the use of the resources provided to all of us by our shared human 
capacity to understand language.  It is a systematic art, then, of promoting recollection 
through the use of language, either in private thought, or in speaking with others.  And 
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251 This is my own, somewhat speculative, interpretation of the significance of Zeus’s role as the god of the 
philosopher-dialecticians in this particular context, given the way in which Plato has chosen to characterize 
Zeus in the allegorical myth of the palinode.  Should this interpretation prove unconvincing, however, the 
remainder of the argument is intended to stand on its own.
the way in which such recollection is best promoted for any given soul, it seems, will 
depend upon the type of soul which it is, both in terms of its unchanging, divine, type, 
and its degree of accomplishment with respect to understanding and virtue.  In their 
experience of love, however, Plato has argued that our lovers have become ‘well 
equipped’ for finding ways of promoting such recollections in themselves in the process 
of pursuing ever greater emulation of their own particular god.  And, since the progress of 
their love has ensured that they will share a common type of soul, both in terms of divine 
type, and in terms of their general degree of accomplishment in virtue and in 
understanding, the ways in which recollection will be best promoted for each of them will 
be very much the same.  In their interactions and conversations with one another over the 
course of their shared life, then, the philosophical friends will be uniquely positioned, as 
well as motivated, to create new knowledge for themselves and one another in just that 
way in which the dialectician is able to do with any given soul whom he may meet,252 by 
engaging together in those uses of language which are most suited to promote 
recollection in souls of the type which they share.  Where the philosopher-dialectician’s 
ability to engage in such collaborative creation of knowledge through “discourse”253 with 
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252 Or, perhaps, at least, any sufficiently accomplished soul he may meet.  The philosopher dialectician may 
not be able to engage in the collaborative creation of new knowledge with souls who are drastically less 
knowledgable and skilled than he is, and may be restricted in his conversations with them to guiding them 
towards the recognition of truths with which he himself is already very familiar, in his role as a true 
rhetorician.  Indeed, one might plausibly read Socrates’ engagement with Phaedrus in the dialogue as a 
whole as an example of just such rhetorical guidance of a less accomplished soul towards greater 
understanding and pursuit of the truth by a philosopher-dialectician in his role as a practitioner of true 
rhetoric.
253 Phaedrus 278a7 etc; c.f. 259d6, where “discourse” is picked out as the distinctive domain of the Muses 
who preside over philosophy.
any type of soul depends upon his systematic, universal, understanding of the natures, 
and therefore the needs, of all of the various types of soul, then, the best kind of friend’s 
ability to engage in this same activity of collaboratively creating knowledge depends 
instead upon his particular, personal, understanding of the natures, and therefore the 
needs, of his and his friend’s own souls.
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Conclusion: A Philosophical Life
 If this reading of the Phaedrus proves a convincing one, then, Plato has provided 
us, here, not only with an account of the best kinds of friendship which anticipates many 
of the most compelling features of Aristotle’s much more celebrated account, but also 
with an intriguing picture of the importance of both personal love and personal friendship 
to the practice of philosophy.  The kind of philosophy which we are accustomed to 
associating with Plato, the rigorous, systematic, dialectical investigation of someone like 
a Socrates, is on this account a way of loving wisdom to which only a very specific sort 
of soul is naturally inclined.  Any other sort of soul, however, if sufficiently virtuous, is 
nevertheless equally capable of pursuing and honoring wisdom in that way to which its 
own type is naturally best suited, through the opportunity afforded by the powerful ability 
of interpersonal love and friendship to alter the course of our lives.  Personal eros and the 
enduring personal philia it creates when correctly pursued can, on this picture, offer any 
one of us a way, through a shared lifelong passion for the perfect and true and 
collaborative pursuit of ever greater virtue and knowledge, of “leading a philosophical 
life.”254
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